

THE  
NATURE  
O F  
T R U T H  
Its Union and Unity  
with the SOULE,  
Which is  
One in its Essence, Faculties,  
Acts; One with TRUTH.

---

Discussed by the Right Honorable  
ROBERT Lord BROOK,  
in a Letter to a private Friend.

By whom it is now published for  
the Publick Good.

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## THE P R E F A C E

to the Reader, Shew-  
ing what first gave  
Birth to This Discourse  
of T R V T H.

R E A D E R,

**W**ithout an E-  
pithet : for,  
you must  
expect no  
complements. I am  
now a Pleader , and so  
am forbid φρουράζειν or  
ἔξω τι λέγειν : Yet, with  
submission to That Se-

A 4      vere

## The Preface

\* Areopagus : for, such were the orders for all Pledgers there: *Aristotel.*  
*Rhet.lib. I.*  
*Lucian.in.*  
*Anachars.*

vere Court\*, I hope 'twill be no offence, by breaking their First Injunction, to keepe their Second. One Word then by way of Preface, may perhaps not seeme unseasonable, unnecessary, and so not εἰξω τὸ πράγματος.

\* This Divine Discourse of *Truth*, coming to me, from so Noble an Hand; I could not envy it the Publicque Light: For, what heart could indure to stifle such a *Beauty*, at its first Birth, at its first Breath? Nay, though Cruelty should

should scorne to take a check, yet Power it selfe,  
might plead impotent,  
for such an Act. For,  
*where*, or who is He, that  
can resist the struglings  
of Divine *Truth*, forcing  
its way out from the  
Wombe of Eternity?  
Where, or who is He  
that by a Viperous  
wreath\*, or other as-  
fault, can smoother *Her-*  
*cules*, though yet but  
sprawling in his cradle?  
View then This new-  
borne *Beauty*; mark its  
Feature, proportion,  
lineaments; Tell mee  
now, was Its Birth an  
A 5 object

\* With  
such, *Ian*,  
assay'd to  
kill *Hera-*  
*cles* in his  
cradle, as  
the Poets  
say.

The Preface

object of pity? or rather of envy? at least admiration; for, Envy findes no place in Noble spirits.

One thing yet, I must excuse ( which yet indeed needs no excuse ) A Second Conception is here First borne; yet not Abortive; no, but by mature thoughts , 'tis againe decreed, the elder shall serve the younger. For, That was meant the Act , This but the Prologue, ushering in That yet more curious Concept(if such be possible) which was an Embryo before

*to the Reader.*

before This, but is yet  
Vnborne.

The truth is, This Noble Lord (the Author of this following Discourse) having dived deep in those Prophetick Mysteries (at which his first times glaunce, in this) was even forced (by that occasion) upon a more exact and abstract speculation of Truth it selfe; naked *Truth*, as in her selfe, without her gown, without her crown.

At first view, hee saw her sparkle with most glorious luster; But her Rayes

Matth.24.  
Apocal.20

## The Preface

Rayes daz'led his eyes,  
so that he durst not, hee  
could not, enough be-  
hold, admire, and adore,  
her perfect Beauty, ex-  
act Proportion, Divine  
Harmony; yet though  
daz'led, he viewed still;  
remembering that of the  
Aeopagite \*, Earthly  
Bodies are best seene in,  
and by, Light; But Spi-  
rituall Beauties, i<sup>s</sup> s<sup>t</sup> in  
obtr<sup>y</sup>, in, and by, Divine  
Clouds, Divine Dark-  
nesse: This, This is the  
best Perspective to Di-  
vine Objects; and the  
Brightest Starres shine  
best, sparkle most, in  
the

Dionys. de  
Divinis Nc-  
minib.

*to the Reader.*

the Darkest, the Blackest  
Night.

That which ravisht  
his Soule most , and  
most inforc'd him more  
to pry, to adore more,  
Was, the experience of  
that which Plato speaks:  
*When our Soules* (saith  
he) *glance first upon* Di-  
vine Light, *they are soon*  
*ravish't, and cannot but pry*  
*more and more, because*  
*in it they see Σύμβολα τι,*  
*somewhat of Kin to them-*  
*selves.* And this Kindred,  
if I mistake not, is the  
nearest possible ; more  
then Consanguinity ; I  
had almost said more  
then

*Epist. ad  
Dionys.*

The Preface

then Identity it selfe. For, alas, that Corporal Union in Materials, which we miscall sometimes Identity, is at best but a cold touch in a point or two; a most disdainful embrace (at greatest distance) in those Beings which have much *περισσον*, and but little *ελαφρον*. as Plato's Master taught him long agoe. But in Spirituall Beings, and in These only, is True Harmony, Exact Convenience, Entire Identity, Perfect Vnion, to be found.

Such, evn Such, is That neer Relation,  
That

See Plato's  
*Parmenid.*  
& *Timæus.*

*to the Reader.*

That neere Kindred between the Soule and Truth; as will fully appeare in This following Discourse of Truth; ( which was never meant, nor now published, but as a Prodromus to a Future Treatise about Propheetick Truth revealed now in Scripture: ) Of which I shall only adde this; Read it; if it displease, Read it again, and yet again; and then judge. It needs not my Apology; if so, I might truly say, When 'twas first Wrot, 'twas intended but a Letter to

*The Preface*

a private Friend, / not  
a Critick;) and since its  
first writing, and send-  
ing, twas never so much  
as perused, much lesse,  
refined, by its Noble  
Author.

One VVord more I  
must speak, and so have  
done. If any Inge-  
nuous Reader shall Dis-  
sent (in any Particular  
of Consequence) and  
freely, yet ingenuously,  
manifest the Reasons of  
his Dissent: Nothing  
can bee more grate-  
full to This Noble  
Lord, who promiseth  
the Fairest Answer, for,  
His

*to the Reader.*

His Aime is only *Search*  
of *Truth*; which, His  
Lordship well knows, is  
oft best found, as *Sparks*  
*in the Flint*, by much  
Contusion.

Yet, if any shall  
wrangle, not dispute:  
rudely thrust, or strike  
not like a Gentleman;  
His Return will be,  
only a *Rationall Neglect*.

*F. S*

28 MR 59

**R**ecensui tractatum hunc, qui  
inscribitur, (The Nature of  
Truth,) per illustrissimum p̄fissi-  
mumque Dom. inum. Robertum  
D. Brooke editum: apprime sane  
Doctum, profundisque conceptibus  
insignitum: quapropter dignissi-  
mum arbitror qui in summa utili-  
tatem typis mandetur.

Novemb. 19.

1640.

Johannes Hansley,  
R. P. Episc. Lond.  
Capell. domest.



THE  
NATURE  
OF  
TRUTH.

Discussed in a Letter  
to a private  
Friend.

---

S I R,

**H**ave according to my poore talent, essayed to finde out the true sense of the Spirit in these \* two Chapters, and

Mat. 24.  
Rev. 20.  
Expoun-  
ded, in a-  
nother  
Treatise.

## The Nature of Truth.

and in this Inquest, have improved the labours of the piously learned; from whom I have received little other favour than this, that they have not seduced me; they not having approached so neere to the truth, as to dazzle it. I confess, that Reverend, that bright man, Master Brightman, hath clothed his opinion, with such a Sirenian glory, that he had almost been to me an *ignis fatuus*. I had almost, in following the old, lost the young, lost the nest of Lapwings. But, with all respect to his Worth, (if I am not mightily mistaken) I have escaped that *Syrtis*; and yet dare I not with the Philosopher cry out *εὐρηκα;* for, \**who is fit for these things?*

\* 2 Cor. 2.

16.

Every

## The Nature of Truth.

Every truth is \*a mystery; what must that be then, which is purposely vailed by the Spirit? *Iesus Christ*, who is styled in Scripture, the \*way, truth, life, light, ( and these things are apprehended by sense, and are common ) is to \*the Iewes a stumbling blocke, and to the Greekes foolishnesse.

\**Veritas in fundo putei.*  
Democr.

\*Ioh.14.6.

\* 1 Cor. 1.  
23.

May we not then justly say of him that dares pry into the Arke, with hopes and thoughts clearly to unfold the mysterious, the prophe-  
ticall part of *Iesus Christ*,  
to unknit the Gordian knot;  
May wee not say of him,  
what G O D saith of *Job*;  
*who is this that darkeneth  
wisedome with counsell?*

Iob 38. 2.

Alas, are we not all since  
*Adams lapse buried under*  
the

## *The Nature of Truth.*

\* 1 Cor.8.2

the shadow of death , and lost in the region of darkness ? Who is there that knoweth truth ? \* *He that thinkeith bee knoweth anything, knoweth nothing as he shoulde.*

Morall truth , which ( as some think ) is yet more within our reach , than those sacred mysteries , is unknown to us , both in the universall nature , and in the particular actings of it ; *Difficilia que pulchra.*

Indeed *Truth* is that golden apple , which though it hath ( in some sense ) beeene offered to the fairest ; yet the most refined wits , the most high-raised fancies of the world , have courted her in vaine , these many ages : For whilſt they have sought , with

## *The Nature of Truth.*

with a Palsie hand, this glorious star, through the perspective of thicke reason, they have either mounted too high, and confounding the Creator with the creature, made her God; or descending too low, and deserting the universal nature, have cōfined their thoughts to some individuall Truth, and restrained her birth to severall parcels within the Chaos.

A double  
error in  
searching  
of truth.

THE

28 MR 59



# THE NATURE OF TRUTH. Its union and unity with the SOULE.

---

## CHAP. I.

*The Understanding and the Truth-understood, are one.*

**R**UTH is indeed of the seed Royall, of Progeny Divine: yet so, as to be (for I may say of her, what the Spirit saith of P. B. 36. Faith)

\*Rom 10.8

Faith) \* neere us, to be in or  
us. And when she is plea-  
sed to descend into our val-  
leys, and to converse with  
us, shee erects her own pa-  
vilion, and doth fix it in  
whatsoever is lovely in us.

The *Vnderstanding* is her  
throne, there she reigneth,  
and as she is there seated,  
as she shineth in that part  
of the soule; she appeareth  
to me under two notions,  
which are also her measure  
through the whole sphere  
of Being; as will be disco-  
vered more hereafter, when  
these lesser streames shall  
have emptied themselves  
by progresse into a larger  
river.

First, that very *Being*,  
which immediatly floweth  
from above, and is the rise

or

or the first and uniforme ground-work in this particular Being which we now treat of, and which under this notion wee call the form or substance.

Secondly, those workings which breathe from thence, as all actions and sayings, which are (in our phrase) the effects of a reasonable soule.

I shall first in few words treat of the first, and then very briefly conclude with a word or two upon the second part of Truth.

This first Truth is the Understanding in its Essence: for what is the Understanding other than a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, conformiug it to

The Vnderstanding or Truth there, under two notions.

An argument proving the nature of the Vnderstanding to be Truth.

the likenesse of the Creator? And is not Truth the same? For the Beauty of Truths character is, that she is a shadow, a resemblance of the first, the best forme; that she is *light*, the species, the sparkling of primitive *light*; that she is *life*, the sublimation of *light*, \* that she may reflect upon her selfe.

That she is *light*, none will deny; that *light* in reasonable creatures is the fountaine of *life*, is manifest. For the forme of a reasonable soule is *light*, and therefore when the soul informeth and giveth *life* to *Animal rationale*, it enableth the creature to work according to *light*, and upon Her accesseth the organs can

*Vita est in  
se reflecōio.  
Sen. Epist.  
Life a  
higher de-  
gree of  
light.*

can entertaine light, as the eye then beholds the light of the Sun; upon Her retirements they are dark and uselesse. Thus whilst life is light, and light is Truth, and Truth is conformity to God; and the understanding as we yet discourse of it, is this light to the soule, the Understanding and Truth can be but one.

The eye by the presence of the soule made able to see lig'it.

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### CHAP. II.

*The second Argument, proving that truth is the Nature of the Understanding.*

**K**now the learned choose rather to stile the understanding, a faculty; and so institute a foule recipient; a

Most call the understanding a faculty.

B 3 Being

Being (*scil.* Truth) received; and a faculty, which is the *understanding*, whereby the soule receiveth and acteth according to what it doth entertaine.

But with submission to their better judgement, I should crave leave to make one *Quare*.

Are there not to the constitution of every Being three notions requisite?

First, the Fountain communicating.

Secondly, the Channell entertaining.

Thirdly, the Waters imparted.

I confess, we must not in Metaphysicall Beings expect Physical substances; yet *ανάλογόν τι* all learning doth allow of. But where shall

Three notions requisite to the constitution of every Being.

shall wee finde these in the *understanding*? whilst the intellect passeth under the notion of a *faculty*. Indeed wee may discerne the last (*scil.*) those sweet beames of *light* which beat upon us continually.

But where is the second which entertaineth them? If it be the *understanding*, then the *light* which differēceth us from the vegetative and sensitive creatures, lieth in the *understanding*, and not in the soule; and the soule (which all men hold to be a spirituall Being) is but a *Theca* to the intellect, as the body is the Tabernacle of the soule. Or, if the soule hath *light* as well as the *understanding*, then are there two enlightened Beings in

The un-  
derstand-  
ing as a  
faculty af-  
fordeth  
not these  
3. notions.

The un-  
derstanding is not  
the subject  
of truth.

*Martii. l.5.  
epi. 53.*

one reasonable creature :  
*Non belle quædam faciunt  
duo, sufficit unus Huic operi.*  
 Two reasonable Beings in  
 one *Compositum*, is too un-  
 reasonable a thing.

Thirdly, Who is it that  
 communicateth this *light*?  
 It is conveyed to the *understanding* either from the  
 soule, or some other way.

The un-  
 derstanding recei-  
 veth not  
 truth from  
 the soule.

If from the soule, then  
 the soule doth not finde the  
 defect of the *understanding*.  
 For, if the soule can com-  
 municate *light*, then hath  
 it *light* already ; the same, or  
 more excellent ; then can it  
 worke, diffuse *light*, and en-  
 joy it selfe ; and so this fa-  
 culty, the *understanding*,  
 shall be in vaine.

If in any other way, it  
 must either be immediately  
 from

from God, or mediante Crea-  
tura.

If from a creature , and  
not from the soule , it must  
be by some other facultie  
intervenient. For , if the  
soule ( which by their con-  
sent is a more noble Agent  
than the *understanding*) can-  
not, according to their Do-  
ctrine, act without a faculty ;  
how shall an inferior Being  
work , without some such  
like subservient help ? And  
thus may you *excurrere in*  
*infinitum*, which, according  
to the Philosophers , may  
not be done ; for, *Entia non*  
*sunt multiplicanda , nisi ne-*  
*cessario*.

Not from  
any crea-  
ture

If the truth come  
from God , then why is it  
not immediately, intrinse-  
cally , infused into the

Not from  
God.

*Deus agit  
a centro in  
circumse-  
reniam.*

In spiritu-  
al giving  
and recei-  
ving there  
must be a  
metaphy-  
sica. union

soule it selfe? But how-  
ever the *understanding* bee  
enricht with this treasure  
of Truth, if it be imparted  
to it, then is it, it selfe that  
Truth, that *light* which I  
contend for. For God doth  
not communicate *light* (by  
*light*(which I take in a Me-  
taphoricall sense) I under-  
stand some spirituall excel-  
lency) and such *light* (I say)  
God doth not offer but to  
*light*. For, *quicquid recipi-  
tur, recipitur ad modum reci-  
pientis.* Cleopatra her dissol-  
ved union would have been  
to *E*sops cocke of lesse  
value than a barley corne.  
And if the *understanding*  
have not *light*, it cannot  
take it, unlesse by being tur-  
ned into the nature of it.  
For what giving and recei-  
ving

ving can here be , besides  
that which maketh both to  
become one and the selfe  
same ? *Light came into the  
world , but it was refused by  
darknesse. Ignoti nulla cu-  
pido.*

John 1.5.

Thus the *understanding*  
and *light* are different in  
names , may be different in  
degrees , but not in nature.  
For what that Reverend  
man i Doctor *Twist* saith  
most acutely of a spirituall  
gift, I may say of spirituall  
*light*. The soule cannot re-  
fuse a spirituall gift ( I now  
speak in his phrase.) The  
soule and any spirituall Be-  
ing doe not , as corporeall  
things , greet each other by  
the help of the *Loco-motive*  
faculty ; but when Grace  
is given by *God* to the soul ,

there

i Doct. of  
Syn.Dort.  
p.25.lin.12  
Neither a  
quality  
perma-  
nent,nor  
an act im-  
manent,  
unless they  
bee made  
inherent  
in the soul,  
and the  
latter also  
produced  
by it,can  
be said to  
be given  
to the soul.

there is, as it were (*da veni-  
am voci*) an hypostaticall  
union betwixt the gift and  
the soule ; and the soule  
cannot reject it , because  
they are no more Two but  
one. So to be in the capa-  
city or act of receiving  
light, is to be light.

To receive  
light is to  
be light.

Lastly, how passeth this  
light from the *understand-  
ing* to the soule ? Will not  
here be left as vast a gulfe,  
as they make betweene the  
*understanding* and the *will*,  
which make them divers;  
whence grow those inex-  
tricable disputes, How the  
the *will* is made to *under-  
stand*, what the *understand-  
ing* judgeth fit to bee wil-  
led ?

C H A P.

**C H A P. III.**

*A prosecution of the second Argument, wherein these three notions are applied to the understanding, being made one with the truth.*

**A**ll these rubs are easily taken out of the way, if you make that which you call the *understanding, truth*. For then have you,

First, the Father of mercies, dispensing light and truth.

Secondly, light and truth dispensed.

Thirdly, the *totum existens*, consisting of matter and forme, of materiall and immateriall Beings (as wee distin-

If you make the understanding light, you have the three notions which make up every Being.

distinguish them) called a reasonable creature thus informed or constituted, which we name the recipient of this light and truth.

Doe not tell me, that I thus make the recipient and thing received all one; that is not strange in emanation divine. In Scripture you have a parallel of this.<sup>1</sup> The fourth viall is poured out upon the Sun (scil.) the Scriptures, and the Scriptures are the viall it selfe; the Scripture is emptied upon it selfe, it is agent and patient, receiver and received. I know learned Mede to prevent this, which to him is a difficulty, imagineth the Emperour to be the Sun; but in two words that is thus disproved.

I The 4. viall men-  
tioned  
Rev.16.8.  
is the thing  
emptying  
and empti-  
ed upon  
it selfe.

First, the Emperour is nowhere called the Sun in this book; when he receiveth a metaphoricall typicall title, he is called the Dragon.

Secondly the Scriptures are in the *Revelation* divers times set forth to us by the Sun. So that if you refuse the sense which I fix upon, then you doe not onely forsake, but oppose the Scripture-phrase.

But were not this truth mounted in a celestiall chariot, *Reason* it selfe would evince it. For consider any individual Being you please, vegetative or rationall, or what you will, who is it that entertaineth this Being, but the Being it selfe which is entertained? Who is it that

Nay in all things Agent and Patient must bee one to him that considereth.

No Being but it is the thing receiving & received

that receiveth from the womb of Eternity that reasonable creature , but the creature received?

The vanity of that question, Whether the soule be *continens* or *contentum*, discovered

The ignorance of this Point, hath raised that empty Question, Whether the Soule or the Body be *contentum*? For if every Being be its own *contentum*, this Question will seeme to be no more a difficulty. And if there happen any neare union betwixt two Beings, as the Body and the Soule, the first is not *continens*, the other *contentum*; but as husband and wife, each bringeth his part towards the making up of the *compositum*.

Thus without any violation of Reasons right, I seeme justly to conclude,  
that

that the *totum existens*, consisting of matter and forme, the reasonable creature, is the Recipient of this truth.

C H A P. IIII.

This Argument further cleared by more objections propounded and answered.

**B**UT still it is demanded, why may not the understanding supply the third place? why may it not be this Recipient?

To whom I give this answer; That if they make the understanding but a quality, and depending upon some other Being, it cannot, as I have proved in this Discourse,

The Understanding cannot be the recipient.

course, be the recipient : but if they look upon it as this light, this truth it selfe, then the dispute is reconciled.

Some call  
the Intel-  
lect *virtus*  
*qua.*

Some conceive, all these difficulties are cured, if you make the understanding only *virtus qua*, concluding with the Philosopher, that *ibi subsistendum est*, without inquiry after a further progresse. I could *Iurare in verba magistri*, I could acquiesce here, but that I desire to be convinced by reason and not by termes. I shall therefore humbly ask this question.

The Intel-  
lect can-  
not be *vir-*  
*tus qua.*

What difference is there betwixt *virtus qua* and a faculty? as in a knife, the cutting ariseth from the sharpnesse, and this sharpnesse is *virtus qua*, or the faculty whereby the knife doth cut.

If

If it be but a faculty, then I repaire to my former answere : but if something else than a faculty, it must either be a nominall Being, or reall existence.

If the first, it beareth no weight.

If the second, then I say, it must entertaine species (for all spirituall glories doe operate by the communication of their divine species) and then will you be cast upon the former rock.

Yet still they say, the *understanding*, being a spirituall Being, receiveth light in some way which we know not; and so they proceede to obscure distinctions and voluminous discourses, concerning *intellectus agens* & *intel-*

As the A-  
rabians,  
Zabarell,  
&c.

The last  
objection  
answered.

\*Act. 17.  
vers. 23.

*intellectus patiens* or *passibili-*  
*lis.* But the wiser sort of  
them, perceiving the thin-  
nesse, aerialnesse and crazi-  
nesse of this Spiders web,  
have with greater probabili-  
ty made God to be *intellectus*  
*agens*, by his influence upon  
the understanding.

*Respon.* Is not this the A-  
thenian Altar, which groan-  
ed under that Superscripti-  
on, \* *To the unknowne God?*  
I would I could discover  
with S. Paul to them this  
light, this truth, which they  
know not, that they might  
love it and imbrace it. But  
secondly, I dispute not a-  
gainst things I know not:  
They know not this. I know  
that I may better maintaine  
the other, that the Under-  
standing *is not the Recipient*  
of

of this light, than they averre  
that *it is*, in a way whereof  
they never hope to finde a-  
ny footsteps.

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CHAP. V.

*The Soule and truth in the  
Soule are one.*

**M**ay yet be pressed  
with this objection : All these difficulties  
may be urged against the  
*Soule*, which have been pro-  
duced against the *Vnder-  
standing*.

*Resp.* Are not these like  
the untrue Mother, who  
will kill the childe, because  
she cannot call it her own ?  
If these inconveniences be  
justly urged against the *Soul*,  
it

---

The Soul,  
Vnder-  
standing,  
Truth, all  
but one.

it will not deliver the *Vnder-*  
*standing*. But I will deale  
ingenuously, and confess  
that if you take the Soule  
under any other notion than  
Truth; If you deeme it, first  
to be a Being, and then to  
be light, as God made *Ad-*  
*dam* first (I meane the body)  
and then breathed life into  
him; if, I say, there be first  
a Being, and then an infusi-  
on of light, you will be  
pressed with the former ar-  
guments. But if you make  
the *Understāding*, the Soul,  
Light, Truth, one, then are  
you quite delivered out of  
all these straights, and then  
is it true which I averre,  
that, that degree of light,  
which we enjoy in the in-  
ward man, is the *specificall*  
*difference*, which distingui-  
sheth

sheth between us and brutes, deservedly called *reason*, that ample Sphere of Truth, which is the *All* in us, and besides which we are wholly nothing.

Are not wee said to be made after the image of God ? and if in any thing we are honoured with this inscription, it is in the most noble part ? Now God is *unus, purus, simplex actus*. For (with submission to his better learning and judgement) I cannot subscribe to Dr Ames his manner of expression, who saith, first there is God, and then his attributes are in him, \* *tanquam in esse secundo*. If then we

*essentiā & inter se distinguuntur non solum ratione rationante, sed etiam rationatā, ita ut fundamen-*  
*rum distinctionis sit in ipso Deo. Theo. lib. 1. cap. 4.*  
*Sect. 27. 28.*

An Argument proving the Soule and Truth to be one.

God and his attributes are not two.

\* *Deo insunt quasi in esse secundo, ab*

doe

do beare his impressē, *quam non passibus equis*, it must be in that which is (as farre as we can judge) *DEI formalis ratio*, which is to be *purus, simplex actus.*

In this our shadowy resemblance of the Deity, I shall not challenge perfectiōn; for though the Scripture say, \* *we shall hereafter be perfect as he is perfect*, and doth here style us, *partakers of divine nature*; yet all this is to be understood according to our little modell. Unity is that wherein wee carry some touches, some lineaments of his Majesty. Unity is Gods Essence. Unity is all what we are. For division being the birth of nothing, can be nothing. And thus may we raise from

\*  
1 Joh. 3.  
vers. 2.

our

our Microcosme, a passable Hieroglyphick of the Trinity.

Truth as it is in the breast of Eternity intended to the Sonnes of men, resembles *Patrem intelligentem*; as it descends from above, *Filium intellectum*; as it informeth the Soule, enjoyeth and reflecteth upon it selfe, *Spiritum dilectum*. We must not then expect, First, a Being of the Soule: Secondly, a faculty whereby it worketh. God and his attributes, are but one; mercy and justice kisse each other in him; he and they are *ens necessarium*; And so the Soule and the Faculty is one, that divine light and truth.

Truth as it hath been described, resemblmeth the Trinity.

## C H A P. V I.

*All things are this one light  
or truth, shinning from God.*

**B**ut if the Intellect,  
the Soul, Light and  
Truth are (from the  
reasons alledged) all but  
one, this argument will  
presse all things that are;  
then will all Beeing fall un-  
der the same Predicament.

This is that which I ay-  
med at; and why not? See-  
ing that, First, all Beeing is  
derived from the same foun-  
taine, scil. from him who is  
uniforme, in all like him-  
selfe.

Secondly, All Being is  
the same in nature, (scil.)  
a beame of that excellent  
light,

light, and therefore in Metaphysicks \* Truth and Being are one.

Thirdly, All Being is entertained in the same manner by every individuall existence, which is the subject receiving this light from above : and all reall true reception is alone by similitude and union of nature.

Yet I shall not agree to confound the names of particular Beings, though I doe conjoyne their natures. For, all Being may be compared to *light*; in such a body it is styled the Sunne; in another it is called the Moone; in the third it beareth the name of a Starre, and under various shapes, the names of various Stars,

C 2 as

\* *Vnum, verum, bonum, Ens, terminiconvertibile.*  
All being is this truth.

as *Syrius*, *Canopus*, &c. but all is *light*, and it is but *light*. The body of waters is by us called *Seas*; when they beate upon such a coast, it beareth one name; when it coasteth upon another soyle, it receiveth a severall denomination. All *Being* is this *light*, this *truth*; but contained within those Circles, it appeareth to us under this name; and againe, it hath another style when it beateth upon a various object.

All *Being* is but *light*, communicating it selfe to us through severall crannies, some greater, some lesse, whilst all is *light*.

\* *Plato* most excellently, most acutely, most truly hath made all *Being* of *Terminus* and *Infinitum*. : The first

\*Vide Pla-tonem in Phile. inti-mæo. Ter-minus, In-fin-itum, prima ele-menta, unde quin-que gene-ra-toru n.

first Being appearing to us  
in severall bounds and mea-  
sures amidst the vast infinity  
of darknesse or nothing.

The Platonick Philosophers do not erre, who re-  
duce all Beings to number,  
making one all and the chief,  
and the other more or lesse  
glorious, as they have two,  
three, or foure, more or  
lesse numbers or degrees.

Ficin. com.  
in Timo.  
Vide Pla-  
tonem ubi.  
que.

Omnes  
numeri in  
unitate.

Whence they had this  
Maxime, I know not ; this I  
know, Satan, that old Ser-  
pent, is very learned, and can  
sometimes (as he doth, wlen  
hee calls Jesus the Christ  
and sonne of God) can, I  
say, sometimes, tell true,  
that so hee may even by  
truth entaile to himselfe a  
certaine interest in such  
Disciples as refuse any

C 3      other

other allurement than that of golden truth : and it is to be feared, that they have had too great and free converse with him. For even this sweet point of learning have they shamefully abused to charmes and spells, as that of the Poet, *Numero Deus impare s' gaudet.* Two was curst , because it first departed from unity ; Three whereby unity againe returned into it selfe, became sacred.

But it may be (*& spero meliora*) that they received it from the Egyptians, and the Egyptians from the Hebrews.

Now, if this be true, (which I submit to the judgement of the wise) then all Being is but one , and all things

*r Virg. in  
papuan.  
f Quia nu-  
merus im-  
par, nume-  
rus indivisi-  
bilis. Ficin.  
comment.  
in Plat.  
Timæ.*

things are more or lesse excellent, as they partake more or lesse of this first Being.

This doctrine of Platonists will not be so unsavory, if we pay unto unity its due tribute. I confess, according to true Philosophy, Time is but *mensura motus vel ordinis*, which both are the same; Number, *calculus temporis*; One is *principium tantum numeri*, and so it is hardly a part of that which is but the handmaid of circumstance.

## CHAP. VII.

*How unity is all in all things.*

**B**ut I should desire that we might consider whether it doth not carry something in

The excellency of unity.

it, in nature more glorious, something that may seem to informe a Being. If I cannot tell what it is, you will excuse me, knowing how hard a thing it is to finde out the Forme of any Being, and how much more hard to discover the Being of a Forme.

But from this reason I doe seeme to collect some glimmering light of what I now propound.

All Being seemeth to breath and catch after *unity*. *Gravia* doe not more naturally incline downwards, than all Being doth naturally seeke for *unity*.

Of Beings there are but two sorts.

Uncreated.

Created.

Un-

Uncreated, is God only.

Created, is

Spirituall.

Morall.

Physicall.

Mathematicall.

In all these you will find  
Unity as it were the Forme  
of their Being.

My thoughts , my ignorance , my no thoughts of the first, incomprehensible, inaccessible Majesty , I desire to propound with fear, trembling and reverence.

If John in the midst of revelation, being overcome with nothing but the glitterings and sparklings of the creature, did mistake , and worshipped one of his fellow-servants ; if the Jewes refused to trample upon any contemptible scroul,fearing

*Rev.22.9.*

lest, in them, the namelesse  
name of God might be in-  
cluded: surely wee in the  
midst of darknesse , having  
to doe, not with the name,  
but with the nature of Eter-  
nity, ought to cloathc our  
spirits with much mode-  
stie.

I shall therefore humbly  
propound this to considera-  
tion, Whether *unity* be  
not *all in God*.

I confesse there are three  
persons in one Godhead (and  
that is the mysterie) and yet  
but one God. And more  
there could not have beeene;  
for this God is infinite, e-  
ternall, &c. and onely one  
can be so; there cannot bee  
two Infinities , two Eterni-  
ties.

And againe, this *one* can-  
not

not be otherwise, for if hee could have been something else, hee had not beeene infinite.

If then *unity* bee such a necessary (give us leave to speake as wee can) accident, as, without which God could not have been what hee is: may it not bee said that *unity* is co-essentiall to him, seeing that the Deity admits of no accidents? And if of his Essence, then unity is in him all, for the Essence of God is all in God, and God in his Essence is but one *Divinity*.

*Vnity all  
in God.*

*Ob.* But so, infinity, power, &c. all attributes are in God his Essence, as well as *unity*?

*Answe.* All other attributes

butes are at length resolved into this of unity. Of this, can be given no accompt, but only negative. All explications flow from this, returne to this, that God is one.

*Fic.com.  
ment.in  
Plat.Sym-  
pos.*

What is it to be infinite? *Ficinus* answers, to have nothing of privation mixt, to be *plenus sui*; which is to be *One*.

The power of God is the unity of all Being in *one point*. What is this, *I am that I am*; but this, *I am one*? The same we may say of all other the names of God.

*Vnity in  
spirituall  
Beings.*

When we survay the nature of spirituall Beings, we shall find them in Scripture stiled *one*. For God reduceth all the commandments

dements to love. And the Saints, who are , *quatenus* Saints , spirituall Beings, (for their Saintship is a spirituall excellency ) are stiled , *Rom. 12.5.* one body ; and, *Gal. 3. 16.* they are all one in *Iesus Christ.*

Christ and his Church are but one body. Now, this *union* carrieth certainly something with it more essentiall than a figure.

When the three persons are united in one deity, the *union* is more close than a figurative *union*. The conjunction of the humane nature, and the second person in the Trinity, is a very entire conjunction ; and so is that of the Saints with Christ. There is the union of the whole humane nature

Gen. 2.24.

1 Cor. 13.

12.

Morall.

ture with one person. Here is the union of divers persons to the whole divine nature. And we may easily allow a neare union to these Metaphysicall Beings : seeing even in naturall things, there is as it were an unity, even of two Physicall existences. For G o D saith, *You two shall be one flesh*; he saith not one, but one flesh. But these are *enigmata*, while we see through glases of flesh.

Seeing Morall Beings are, by generall consent, of fraternall alliance to spirituall, both in nature and operation; I shall not say any thing of them, but onely what is said by all, that *virtutes sunt concatenatae*.

I shall therefore minde  
you

Vnitie in  
Physicall  
Beings.

you but of this, how in Physicall Beings, every thing doth delight in unity. And this is very plaine in the stilleids of water, which, if there be water enough to follow, will draw themselves into a small thred, because they will not sever : and when they must disunire, then they cast themselves into round drops, as the figure most resembling unity.

Whence is that Sympathy in nature betweene the Earth and the Adamant, but from hence, that they being of one nature, desire to improve their unity by mutuall imbraces ?

When have the Sun-beams their vigour and efficacy, beating upon the burning glasse, but

but when the glasse hath gathered them all into one ?

Where is the power of our five senses, which are in their nature so honourable, that *nihil cadit in intellectum, quod non prius cadit in sensum*? Where is their vertue, but in *communis sensus*? Nay (if I durst be so bold) but this I may not now dispute: I conceive all the senses are but one, and that is \* *Tactus*. For their Energie is nothing till the ray from the object to the organ, and from the organ to the object touch in one.

It is most happily expressed by Sir John Suckling;

[Who having drawn the breasts  
of wit and fancie drie,

\* I am informed that my Lord Castile-Island in his book *d: Veritate*, affirmeth that there is but one sense: but I am not so happy as to have that booke by me, nor doe I remember it since my last reading it, so that I dare not say it confidently.

*May*

May justly now write Man,  
must not a Suckling die.]

When he saith,

The circumambient aire doth  
make us all  
To be but one bare Indivi-  
duall.

Sir Io'n  
Suckling in  
his Play,  
Act 2,  
Scene 1.

What are the Mathematicall sciences, but *Vnity* turning it selfe into severall formes of *Numbers* and *Figures*, yet still remaining entire ? Harmony, proportion, proportionality, which are the subject, the soule of all Knowledge here, are so many severall names of the same unity. Beauty is but one act of grace and sweetnesse, which seemes to us composed of various parcels. \*Musick is one

Ficin.Com-  
ment. in  
Sympo.  
Plat.  
\*Ficin.Com-  
ment. in  
Tim.Plat.

one forme resulting from many different sounds. This is that mystery, which unknowne, hath confounded the Schools in that Question, whether quantity be *divisibilis in semper divisibile*. All things are certainly at last reduced to an *Vnity*; yea, all things appeare to us cloathed with one forme; yet are we never able to search out the perfection of this, when we most accurately pursue it. The glory and majesty thereof is such, that it rendreth our minds uncapable of any more than a grosse view, like that of the Sunne in his splendour.

*Democritus* his definition of Being, is very considerable, \**Est aliquid differens à se,*

\* Plato in  
symp. in  
Orat. Eri-  
xym.

âſe, quod ſibi conuenit: and indeed, all Being is but one, taking various shapes, ſometimes discovering it ſelfe under one, ſometimes under another, whereas it is but one Being: and this is light, truth, that (as I ſaid before) beamē of divine glory, which is the ſpring of all Beings.

To close this discourse, give me leave thus to ſet forth that Maieſty, whereby Unity wrappeth up all things within it ſelfe. There can be no rececence from Unity, unleſſe by addition of a new, diſtinct, Unity. But where will you finde This? A ſimple Unity muſt be en-tirely one with the First; if you adde any thing to Unity, whereby it may differ, it

it remaines no more One,  
but becomes a Duality.

Nominall  
division of  
Being re-  
quisite for  
our con-  
versie.

Yet doe I in no wise re-  
ject that division of Being  
left us by our Masters,  
when they teach us , that  
there is first a Being which  
is knowne to Be, but it selfe  
in its Being is insensible.

Secondly , another that  
is sensible, but knoweth not  
its owne excellency.

Thirdly,that which know-  
ing its owne excellency,  
can reflect upon it selfe.  
For, I say, this which is cal-  
led vegetative, sensitive, and  
rationall, is all of one na-  
ture.

CHAP. VIII.

*The nature of Habits.*

**A**nd whilst I affirme  
that the soule is  
nothing but this  
*Truth*, I doe not refuse the  
doctrine of *Habits*, either  
*Infused or Acquisite.*

For when the soule by  
virtue of its Being, is cleare  
in such a truth, it is said to be  
an infused habit. When by  
frequent action, such a truth  
is connaturall to the soule,  
it may be stiled an habit  
acquisite: though indeed all  
is but light more or lesse  
glorious, discovering it  
selfe frequently or rarely,  
and by divine appointment,  
at

Habits in-  
fused, ac-  
quisite.

at such a conjunction of time, and not any other, not that the soule is informed by its owne action; for what hath the stremme which it derives not from the source? What can those workings adde to that, from which they receive themselves?

And therefore I wholly subscribe to the Platonists, who make all *scientia* nothing but *reminiscientia*; for when it appeareth not, it is not; the soule being but an activity, it must be no more than it acteth: and though we seeime by frequent actings to helpe the soule, and so to create in it acquisite habits, yet these are but a *Phænomenon*. This is but the way which

which God discloseth to our eye, whereas all the actings are onely new discoveries.

Our Philosophers affirme thus boldly of the unreasonable creature, attributing it all to the instinct, or a new influence.

Why may not, why must not we conclude the same of man, seeing it is a received truth, that *acti agimus*, and we are in our strength in regard of God no better than the most abject creature?

But if *all* be one; (Soule, Understanding, Habits, all the same:) then neither doe faith and reason differ.

Surely they differ onely in degrees, not in nature.

That Reverend holy man,  
that

The difference between naturall and supernaturall habits.

\* Mr Bail.  
*Divers sorts*

that dexterous *cominus-pugnator*, seemeth to averre the same or more in historicall and saving faith\*.

*of Faith.* page 3. Faith signifying beleefe, is used to note, first an ordinary knowledge and bare assent to the historicall truth of the Speaker, though sometimes holpen by experiments, and other inducements and probabilities of the things: and this is called Faith Historicall, that is, a naked, imperfect, dead assent, wi. hout trust or confidence in the mercies of God, or adherence to the commandements. Howbeit we must not imagine, that Faith is reputed unsound or not salvificall, because Historicall (rather it is oftentimes unsufficient to save, because it is not so fully Historicall as might be) but the name of Historicall Faith arose hence, that some are said to beleeve, who did never embrace Christ as their only Saviour with all their hearts, nor confidently rely upon the promises of mercy; otherwise, justifying Faith doth more certainly beleeve the truth of the history of the Gospel, and so is more historicall than the Faith called Historicall.

\* These  
means  
teach us  
further

*M<sup>r</sup> Huit in his Anatomy  
of Conscience, cleerely af-  
firmeth it.\**

to make much of the least beginnings of grace, even those which Divines commonly call repressing, since they prepare the heart to conversion, and in some sense

sense be called the inchoation thereof : seeing temporary and living faith differ not in forme, but degrees of perfection ; there is a faith in the true convert, of no better perfection than that in the temporary, though he stay not there, as the other ( being an unwise son) doth. *Huit Anat. Conscience pag. 214.*

The first degree is Reason.

A second, Historically.

A third, Temporary.

A fourth, Saving faith.

A fift, Plerophorie.

A sixt, \**Beatifica visio,*  
that light whereby we shall see  
as we are scene; these are of  
the same nature with that  
light which a reprobate is  
partaker of.

And if any man question  
the truth of this, let him but  
consider, that the Donor is  
the same, our good God.

The Efficient, Instrumental,  
and Formall cause, is Je-  
sus Christ.

D

The

\* *Ioh. 3.  
vers. 2.*

The subject recipient, the totum existens.

And the Gift it selfe is light or truth, a spirituall Being.

How can it choose then, but to be one and the same, seeing (as I said before) such a Recipient cannot entertain any other guest?

Neither doe I at all abett that unhappy opinion of falling away from Grace.

There is in the opinion a liquid nefasti, and therefore I study to shun it. The propugnators of it are unhappy; for they have not onely made a rent amongst us, but strengthened a common adversary.

The oppugnators also are unhappy; for they have so managed the cause, that their

The controversie about falling from Grace.

Adver-

Adversaries lie almost under invincible darknesse : for the oppugnators fearing to speake plaine, have called *Spontaneitatem, liberam voluntatem*, and it is impossible to distinguish betweene *Libera voluntas Contra-Remonstrantium, & liberum arbitrium Remonstrantium.*

And whilst the *Remonstrants* finde no difference in this main Tenet, they weigh all the rest in the same scale, and judge accordingly. For an argument often alledged by many learned men, if it confuteth not, it doth confirme an error ; and thus are they out of the reach of truth.

That learned, that pious man, the first fruit of our Church her resurrection, fa-

mous Calvin styled it Spontaneitatem, and not liberam voluntatem: For, Deus and libera voluntas are incompatible, not to be clemented by that distinction without difference, Libera à necessitate, sed non ab infallibilitate. And therefore mighty \*Rutherford affirms, that posse Dei decreto absoluto (and all things are under such a decree) insulse queritur an potentia libera sub eo decreto si indifferens.

\* Deo enim,  
sive scientiam ejus spe-  
cimus,  
quippe omnia scit;  
sive volun-  
tatem, que  
ad nihil cre-  
atum vel

creabile est suspensa, sed ab eterno determinata, nulla potest disjunctiva: considerari quidem potest potentia creata, non considerato divino decreto, & in signo ratio- nis decretum Dei antecedente. Sed in tali Chimaris consideratione, adversary nobis litem vitiösā nuce ha- emptitandam rūstraserunt. Ac verò acta, non est ullā po- tentia creata, nisiquæ sū' est aeterno DEI decreto, nisiquæ a Deo's divinæ providentiae renuntiare velit, &c. Rutherford. Exerc. Apolog. Exerc. I. c. I. Sect. 8.

But here I am not to, I cannot, dispute this question. Only I say thus much, it is so unhappy an opinion, that I hope I shall not at all abett it.

For though Reason and Faith be one in nature: yet is not *reason* that degree of *light*, of which the Spirit bath said, *My seed is in you, and you cannot finde*. And therefore men cannot lose that which they never had. And this will be a little more cleere, by the answer to the next objection, which is this.

If Faith and Reason, if knowledge and grace be all but one light, how commeth it to passe, that some who have lesse light, have more faith, and those again,

Ioh. 3. 9.  
Difference  
betwixt  
Knowledg  
and Faith.

*Object.*

D 3      who

who are for knowledge, as Angels of light, are not partakers of that which is called *Saving faith*?

This difficulty is rather mazy, than strong; I shall therefore hope to bring the Ariadnean thread.

And at first abord, I deny the proposition. I conceive it a mistake. For I doe verily beleeeve, that the weakest Saint knoweth more of God, than the most intelligent of those Spirits, who though once in heaven, are now in intolerable flames.

All men confess thus much, that even the meanest Christian, hath more experimental knowledge of God, than Beelzebub the Prince of the aire. And doth not this convince them of what

what I affirme ? For what ( to speake in their language ) is experiment, but the daughter of light , gathered by frequent observation ? If experiment be but light, and their experience is more than that of the greatest wits ; then ( if I mistake not ) by necessary consequence , their light is more and greater .

But I suppose, the error may be cleared by this Simile .

The one is as the man who hath studied the Theory, the other the Practicke of any art or science .

The first may know more in appearance ; but the other indeed knoweth more .

You shall finde two unequally learned, The first is

Experi-  
ence, col-  
lection of  
particular  
lights.

Knowledg,  
real.  
appar-  
rent.

a Gnosticke, a *helluo literarum*, the other hath not  
read so much, but hath concocted, mastered and sub-  
dued all before him. Which now is said to know more?

Psal. 14.1.

*The foole hath said (not,  
as some expound it, wished)  
in his heart, there is no GOD.  
It is true, now and then he  
hath some glimmering light  
of a Deity, but anon againe  
all is shaken, and he saith,  
there is no God.*

Psal. 12. 4.

*Doth not the people of  
Israel say, wee are our owne  
Lords, who shall controll  
us? We have made a cove-  
nant with death and hell,  
and none shall reach us. Can  
these men, these Beings be  
said to know God?*

If you object the devils  
age and experience, it can-  
not

not help ; it is but , as you call it , a collection of his owne lights , and all the starres shining together make not day .

I should onely aske this one question , *Can the devils beleeve or know God to be all mercy ?* It is impossible , because they cannot beleeve him so to themselves .

*Ob.* But some say , Neither doe the best men beleeve him so to the wicked .

*Resp.* Yes , we doe , wee know him in his nature to be mercifull to them .

Besides , mercy and justice are all but one thing in God ; and this those miserable Creatures cannot consent to , that their ruine is the effect of supreme perfection , infinite sweetnesse .

God , mercy and sweetnesse to the devils .

To the confirmation of this, I shall but presse this one consideration.

As wee  
know, wee  
love.

Διηγέσις ὁ  
σπουδαῖος  
τῷ τὰ λε-  
θεῖς εὐ πά-  
σιν ὄραν·  
καὶ ων καὶ  
μέτρον αὐ.  
Arist. Eth.  
lib 3.c.6.  
vide & c.7.  
c.1.ca fi-  
nem.

If they did *know* more than the Saints, they must needs *love* more; and in this I shall have all those my abettors, who hold that the *will* doth necessarily follow the *understanding*; which whilst *Aristotle* denieth in broad and open disputes, he doth in tacite termes closely yeeld to.

I doe apprehend it an undeniable truth, that what Good soever I know to be good, I must love. And therefore if wicked men did know more of God, they must know him needs under the notion of good: and so Seeing goodnessse in his nature, they must love him

him more. I might adde, what good we know, we are: our act of understanding being an act of *union*, which (as before) being Metaphysicall in the soule, must be entire.

What we  
know, we  
are.

## CHAP. IX.

*The difference betwixt Knowledge and affection, discussed.*

**T**may be that what hath beene disputed, will be granted: but there is yet an objection which requireth solution.

**O**b. If all Being differeth onely in degrees, not nature; if knowledge, affection,

fection, light, activity, bee all one ; Whence is it that even amongst Christian men, holy, spirituall men, men of largest affections, (and the affections are the *activity*, the maine of the Soule) I say men of the largest affections are esteemed to know least of God ? And others, whose affections are as it were benummed, and all activity is placed in their braine, understand more of the divine nature ?

Doth it not appear from hence, say they, that all Being is not one , differing onely in degrees : but that there are even different natures, amongst which one may excell, whilst the other is deprest ?

*Sol.* I could tell these men

men, who start the objection, that they deeme the light in the head, more than the *love* in the heart : and then I shall say, that with them the head is the higher degree, the heart the lower degree of light , and so all is but a different light ; from whence, affection, being judgement in its infancy , ceaseth , when Knowledge groweth mature : as the heate and blaze of fire, is but its labouring towards purity and perfection, which therefore are no more when the cleare flame reacheth its Element. But other men think otherwise , and they doe pitch *all in the affections*, and the meaner light in the understanding ; and so turning the table, still one shall be

Affection  
handmaid  
to Know-  
ledge ac-  
cording to  
some.

Knowldg  
a step to  
Affection,  
according  
to others.  
Knowldg  
& affection  
names  
of differ-  
ent de-  
grees in  
the same  
nature.

Affection  
perfection  
of Know-  
ledge.

be a parcell of, or a step to  
the other, and each carry a-  
long *both* in equall measure  
according to reality : how  
much true affection, so  
much knowledge, & vice  
*versa* : as I shall shew in o-  
ther two answers, on which  
I fixe the strength of my  
thoughts in this point. And  
therefore

Secondly, I affirme con-  
fidently, and, I hope, truly,  
that he, who soars upon the  
wings of *Affection*, and lay-  
eth himselfe in the arms of  
Jesus Christ, though hee  
amuse not his head with  
the mysticall nature of the  
Trinity, with the processi-  
on of the Spirit, with the  
*incarnation* of Jesus Christ,  
attempting to make that  
holy oyle ; Touching the  
Ark,

Arke, this glory which is too high for him ; loosing himselfe, while he laboreth to see how *humane* nature can be raised so high; *divine* condescend so low, as to bring forth the Hypostaticall Union : I say, such a one knoweth more of God, than the other.

It is often seene, a working head is like an over-hot liver, burneth up the heart, and so ruineth both : Whereas sweet humble affections, are the onely way to keepe the poore creature in a constancy of spirituall health. And in this care the Apostle to *Titus* forbids foolish questions, endlessse genealogies, contentions, and brawlings about the Law.

This Law is the rule of life

Know-  
ledge of-  
ten no  
Know-  
ledge, but  
a vaine  
swelling.

*Tit. 3.6.*

Knowledg  
without  
power, e-  
ven in the  
law for-  
bidden.

Ceremo-  
niall law  
included  
in the Mo-  
rall.

Mat.5. 28.

Mar.7. 29.

life; and if we know not the Law, we cannot keepe the Law, and so we must perish; and yet we finde the search of this forbidden.

*Object.* Some will say, here is meant the Ceremoniall Law.

*Answ.* I will allow it; but is not the Ceremoniall included under the second precept? The people upon Christ his Sermon, wherein he taught, that *He that looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her in his heart* (and so he gave the Law its full latitude) say, *He speaketh as one that hath authority, and not as the Scribes and Pharises*: conceiving it their duty and happinesse to know the Law

Law in its utmost limits ; and yet we are restrained from any brain-sick, heady, nice inquiry, even into the Law, *scil.* not to busie our heads with the knowing part , in over-great proportion , but labour to bring our knowledge to practise.

If then all such knowledge (I meane all knowledge of this nature ) bee forbidden , it is because it is not good ; it is not knowledge , but a vaine tumour in stead of reall greatnessse or growth : and that other of the affection , hath certainly more of God in it, and so more of truth.

The Apostle is so great an enemy to this kinde of know-

1 Cor. 11.

16.

knowledge, that having disputed such a point in disdain of gain-sayers, he concludeth, *If any man lust to be contentious, we have no such custome, nor the Churches of God.*

Cant. 2.1.

— *Demonstrat quaelibet herba Deum.* He who refreshed with the sweet odours, pleased with the various comely shapes of a flower, can say, this is sweet, this is lovely, lovely indeed ; Yet Jesus Christ is a bed of spices, as the Lilly of the field, the Rose of Sharon, sweeter, much sweeter, ten thousand times more lovely. This man knoweth God, this man loveth God, this man knoweth him indeed ; and this knowledge, as it is the most pleasant here, so it will certainly

tainly prove the most profitable hereafter, and alwayes declare it selfe most reall.

Doth not the Apostle, doth not he most truly, most pathetically cry out; *Tbough I had the gift of prophecie, and knew all secrets, all knowledge, yea, if I had all faith, so that I could remove mountaines, I were nothing; I were as sounding brasse and atinsckling Cymbal, if I have not charity.* When all these excellencies meet in a Christian, as happily they may, yet it is charity that maketh him what he is, and the other Beings are but as *Phaleræ*, as trappings which give a handsome set-off, but not a Being to a Christian.

Love is lovely in Gods  
eye,

*-Cor.13.2.*

God, from  
whom all  
light com-  
meth, is  
full'd Love  
1 Ioh 4 16.

eye, he is stiled the God of Love, the *God Love*. And in another place, the Scripture affirmeth that in this we have fulfilled the will of God, if we *love* one another; for by this we are made one with God, and so dwell in true light.

The two Tables are reduced to *Love* of God and our neighbour. So that sweet affections doe make the most sweet harmony in Gods eares. Of the Chorus of Saints, the greatest number will bee found amongst the feminine sexe, because these are most naturally capable of affection, and so most apt to make knowledge reall. It is true, I confess, these affections misguided, led them first into

Women  
in greatest  
number  
truly graci-  
ous, be-  
cause most  
affectionate.

into transgression; but these same affections after, carried them first to the grave, then to the sight of a Saviour, gave them the enwombing of Christ, who (in some sense) might have entertained our nature in another way (if he had so pleased;) and these affections will one day raise many of them into the sweet embraces of everlasting joy.

Amongst the Church-Officers, the Pastor and the Doctor, according to *Timothie*, are more eminent than the rest, because *they labour in the word and doctrine*. Of these two, the Doctor is always to have his sword always girt about his thigh, he must enter into the lists with every uncircumcised

I Tim. 5.17

circumcised Goliah. Hee must stand continuall senti-  
nall, that no heresies be for-  
ced upon the Church. He  
must beat his braines in dis-  
solving *difficultia*, and clear-  
ing *obscura*. He must some-  
times faint away in wate-  
ry cold fits, by picking up,  
and throwing out witlesse,  
saplesse sophismes, which  
though they cannot hurt  
the strong, may seduce the  
weake. In the meane time,  
the Pastor leadeth the flock  
into the sweet and pleasant  
meadowes, feeding them by  
the little brooks of seeming-  
ly shallow affections; and yet  
this man shall not onely  
receive equall honour with  
the Doctor, but be prefer-  
red before him ; as appear-  
eth clearly in *Eph. 4. 11.*

*I Cor.*

The Pa-  
stor pre-  
ferred be-  
fore the  
Teacher,  
because  
the truth  
of truth  
in the  
heart li-  
eth in the  
affection.

*1 Cor. 12. 26.* As it was with the Israelites, so it is here ; those who keepe the stiffe, receive equall reward with the combatants. I doe therefore conclude , Hee who hath the largest affections, hath most of God, most of his image, which is renewed in knowledge.

Thirdly, sometimes it hapneth, that those who have the largest knowledge, have the most enlarged affections, even to our eye ; and this is happinesse indeed. I confess, it doth not so seeme to an eye that would read it running ; but if it be exactly looked on, if it be presented to our view in the pourtrait of an example, I thinke it will be very cleare.

Know-  
ledge ,  
where it  
is eminent  
in truth as  
well as ap-  
pearance ,  
there affe-  
ction is e-  
qually e-  
minent.

*David.*

David and  
Salomon  
compared  
with Paul.

*David and Salomon compared with Paul, will be as a thousand witnesses. The two first doe seeme to out-strip all men in affection, they are brim-full, running over.*

For, *David* is stiled the sweet Singer of Israel ; in his Psalmes he is ever magnifying the rich mercies of God, singing forth the praises of God, chusing rather to be a doore-keeper in the house of God, than to dwell in the tents of *Mesech*: making his Word to be a light unto his feet, and a lanthorn unto his paths, placing all his delight in the Law of the Lord.

*Salomon* is the happy Penman of that Hymne, which by the Spirit is stiled the Song

Song of Songs. Yet for all this, even in this, they are both exceeded by Saint Paul.

But some, it may be, will imagine those Worthies to be endowed with higher gifts of Nature and Art, than S. Paul: and then they will give all the glory to their understanding, and not to their affections.

If it be so, I confess I have not fitly chosen my Opposites; But the truth will then appeare in Them, without comparison distinctly.

For, if in affection they exceed all, and in abilities are as Saul, taller than their brethren by head and shoulders, then is it manifest in them, that eftsoone men of

E the

*The Nature of Truth,*

the most raised parts, of highest abilities, doe super-abound in love.

But, if, in things which are not directly of Faith, I could cease to be a Sceptique, I should with that most Reverend Worthy, *Thomas Goodwin*, give Saint *Paul* for head and heart, that Throne in heaven which is placed next to Jesus Christ. But *secret things belong to God*; let us onely compare their eminency here below. I think it will be out of question, that Saint *Paul* was the most excellent. For, though *Salomon* (there I suppose will be the difficulty) be said to be the wisest of men, that ever were, that ever should be; yet that is to be applied onely to Go-

vern-

vernment, and (if it may reach so farre) to his excellent skill in naturall Philosophy.

View but Saint Paul, and see whether he doth not excell in every thing. He had gathered up vast learning at the feet of Gamaliel; for his parts he was advanced to eminent power in Church and Common-wealth. He saith of himselfe, *I profited in the Jewes religion above many my equalls in my owne nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers.* And after his conversion, he was judged the only man fit to contend with the Philosophers at Athens. For they who seemed to be somewhat, in conference added nothing

Solomons preemi-nence in knowledg extended to Politiicks, and naturall Philoso-phy only.

to him. And therefore to him was committed the unravelling of all the difficult knots. It is he that disputes about meates , long haire, divorces, irregular partings of husband and wife. It is he that openeth the nature of prophecie, evinceth the resurrection from the dead, maintaineth justification by faith. And that he may be perfect in knowledge, God is pleased (whether in the flesh or spirit, he knoweth not ) to take him into the third heavens : and there he was so filled with Revelation, that God was forced to put the *Philomela-Thorne* under his breast, that hee might not fall into the sleep of sin, and so give himselfe up (as *Sampson*) into the hands

hands of Philistine enemies. And yet this man exceeds all men in affections, and in his affections surpasseth all his other excellencies. It is hee that is often in journies, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by his owne nation, in perils amongst the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wildernes, in perils in the sea, in perils amongst false Brethren, in weariness and painfulnesse, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold & nakednesse. And as he saith of himselfe, *who was weak and I was not weak? who was offended and I did not burne?* It is hee that fought with the beasts at Ephesus. He

*2 Cor. 11.  
26.*

is content not onely to bee bound, but to die for Christ.

Good Saint Paul was so tender over his kinsmen according to the flesh, that for their sakes he could willingly be content to be separated from the love of the Lord Jesus Christ. And this is greater love than that which Christ mentioneth; for no man had then shewed greater love than to die; but this holy Saint will goe one step further, he will suffer an eternall death for his friend.

Thus, if suffering either for the head, or members, for the Church, or Christ, will discover affection, I suppose hee will merit the Garland.

And

And as a complement  
and crowne of all, if to live  
be most for Gods glory,  
though death be his advan-  
tage, he is resolved to sub-  
mit, making obedience to  
Christ in life and death, his  
gaine and triumph.

I confesse, when he tra-  
velleth through those brie-  
ry disputes, he cannot dis-  
play such sparkling vivid  
affections: But when hee  
hath gotten but a little a-  
bove those lime-twigs, how  
doth he mount on high,  
and there, upon even wings,  
disdaine all things below,  
triumphing in the imbraces  
of his Saviour, who is to  
him more choice than the  
choicest of ten thousand?

If what I have attempted  
to prove, be true, as I hope

E 4 it

True knowledg, true affection, separated from all appearances or outward advantages of the body, or the like, are one.

it is, then Consider, Either those who are eminent in affection, and otherwise know little; or those who, as they abound in one, are also Masters in the other: Distinguish appearances from truth; Reading, memory, discourses, effects of sense or complexion, from that which entreth the soule, becommeth reall there, acteth, floweth from thence as a spring: And then will you conclude, that all knowledg lieth in the affection; that all knowledge is but one, differing onely in degrees.

And lastly, that all, whether knowledge or affection, is but the *Truth*, that spirituall ray of heavenly light which God is pleased

to

to present to our view under severall shapes, yet is but one and the same Being, scil. light and truth.

C H A P. X.

*That all the severall and particular actings of the soule, are this one light and truth.*

**H**US have I dispatch't the first discourse of the generall form and nature of the Understanding. Now concerning the particular and various workings thereof, in conclusions, simple apprehensions, negations and affirmations, &c. which seeme to be the offspring of the first and ori-

Apprehen-  
sions, con-  
clusions,  
affirma-  
tions, &c.  
all one  
truth in  
the soule.

ginall Being; even these, I hope to prove all one and the same, as with themselves, so with the former, all conjoyned in one Being of *light* and *truth*. *That* is truth in the fountaine, *this* in the streames; and no man will deny the fountaine and streme to make one river. Onely, sometimes it appeareth in such a shape, sometimes in another, but is still the same soule.

The operations of the soule are proved one with the essence thereof.

This will appear if wee compare the nature of the Soule or Understanding (for we have proved them both one) with their irradiations, actings and severall emanations. *Res enim dignoscendæ sunt ex causis.* Now, we conceive the first Being to be no other thing, than

than *activity*, so confess by all. And if you would know what an *activity* is, you shall finde it to be either *potentia agendi*, or *ipsa actio*, or rather *actus primus & actus secundus*.

If it be *actus*, either *Primus* or *Secundus* (for *primus* and *secundus* are to me differenc'd onely by time, and so not differenc'd at all, (of which I will presently speak a little more) it must be still in work, and is no longer than it acts. Now, what can this act be in this subject, whereof we discourse, but the reasonable working of the soule in this or that conclusion? If it be any other than a work of reason, how can it constitute, or become the forme of a rationall soule and humane understand-

derstanding ? If it be such, how differs it from thought, ratiocination or positions in the minde ?

The acti-  
vity which  
is the forme  
of the soule,  
not differ-  
rent from  
the actions  
thereof.

Whilst then these con-  
clusions, sayings, actions,  
are the forme of that truth,  
of that universall first truth,  
they must be that truth. For,  
*forma quæ dat esse, est esse*,  
and whatsoever is the forme  
of any thing, that is the Be-  
ing of it. For, Being and  
Forme are but one.

If the forme of this acti-  
vity be not these reasonable  
workings, it must be some-  
thing either of a baser allay,  
or of a higher stamp.

If the latter ; then you  
speak of Angels or some o-  
ther spiritual Being, if there  
be any which is more noble  
than the soule. And then  
how

Not of a  
higher  
straine.

how doth this excellency discover it selfe ? Where or what is it ? How is it said that Action is the perfection of all things ?

If the former ; then first you descend to some lower degree of existency ; for, all Being is but an activity ; and according to the glory or basenesse of that activity, doth the Being receive denomination.

Nor of a  
lower.

Or secondly; Shall the cause be more ignoble than the effects ? What then ? If it be neither more excellent, nor lower, is it various, hath it lesse or more of action ? still you fall at the same stone.

Neither  
can it be  
various.

But they who approve of the distinction of *actus primus* and *actus secundus*, think they

they salve all by the distinction of substance and accident ; So, with them, *actus primus* is the Being, the substance it selfe : and *actus secundus* is the product of that Being or accident belonging to that which they make a soule ; and thus forgetting this, that *omnis virtus consistit in actione*, they make the soule a meere virtuall Being.

The distinction betweene  
*actus primus* and  
*actus secundus*, examined.

But, besides that the former Reasons are not thus everted, of these men I should ask this question.

What is this their *actus primus*? What is the forme of it? What is with them the forme of a reasonable soule?

Is not Reason? can there then be a soule, till there be reason?

reason? And this Reason is not *potentia ratiocinandi*, but *Ratio*. For, if you distinguish between the act and power, the act must ever be first in order, dignity, and nature.

So then, What is the form of this *primus actus*? is not some act? if it be, it must exist; else you will allow it but a bare notionall Being, which lyeth in the apprehension. And if it doth exist, must it not be this which you call *actus secundus*?

If it be not an act, they make it nothing but a power, a faculty depending upon something else. And if this be the nature of the first, what can the seconrd Being (which is the effect, and so lower)

lower) be, but a bare notion?

The distinction  
betweene  
Substance  
and Accident  
call'd into  
question.

If here were fit place, I might perhaps set upon the Rack that long-famous Distinction of *Substance* and *Accident*, wherby It should be forced to confess it selfe an aged imposture, at least in the generall and frequent acceptance.

But the activity consisting in the action, That and It shall both be proved but one; and so, *actus primus* and *actus secundus* are this same truth, this light which I plead for.

CHAP. XI.

An objection answered, in which the nature of Time and Place are touched.



Et this doth exceedingly stumble mens thoughts ; wee see various actings of the soule, distinguished by the circumstan- ces of Time and Place ; there are severall distinct actings ; are there then so many severall soules ?

First, I could justly give this answer ; When these men can tell me what *time* and *place* is , I doe hope I shall finde both time and place to dissolve the difficulties.

Second-

Secondly, I shall, I suppose, both by reason and their owne assertions in the like case, prove that *time* and *place* are nothing, or alter nothing in this point; and that, these simile's will a little irradiate.

The nature of Beauty illustrating time and place.

Beauty (if I bring not the exact discription of the learned, yet I shall remember so much as concerneth the point in hand) consists in complexion, in lineaments, and in harmony.

Complexion draweth his Being from colour, from the subject wherein colour is seated, the spirits which give a Being to this colour, &c. and these are differenced by many circumstances. Lineaments as they are adorned by, so are they the orna-

ornaments of this complexion. And these againe are divers from themselves, and divers from Harmony. And yet, by Harmony, these make up one sweet, one pleasant Being, which we call Beauty.

A Flame rising from divers thornes, is not many, is but one flame. A stremme filled with various springs, is not various, is but one stremme. So is it in our case.

Those Circumstances of time and place, differencing these various Beings, are something, or nothing.

If nothing, the objection is answered.

If something, they are a piece of the whole, they serve to make up that harmony,

mony, which we call Beauty, *κόσμος*. Thus time and place, with all Beings of the like nature, are either nothing, or else they have a share in the Being, and make up the *totum Compositum*.

Time and Place nothing different from the essence of the soul.

The Soule is but one Act distinguished to our notion by severall apparitions; and these intervals, with all variations, either are nothing, or are of the nature of the Soule, and serve to make up that confort, that truth, that life that we now discourse of.

And that this is so, I hope by this cleere ratiocination to leave you assured.

Time and Place seeme to me nothing but an extrinsecall modification of a thing. I cannot finde that the learned

ned have made any thing at all of them. Let us survey them, as they define them, when they treat of them ; as they esteem them, when they meete them occassio-nally.

How hath *Aristotle* defined Place ? *Est superficies concava corporis ambientis* ; Where is the truth of this in the highest heaven which incompasseth all the rest ? Hath *Ramus* any whit ad-vanced the cause in his de-finition ? *Est subjectum rei locatio* ; *Idem per Idem* ! Are not those who propound, and they who entertain such a definition, justly com-pared to the Constable and the Country-Justice ? The first having received from some higher power a War-rant,

The defi-nitions of time and place re-jected.

Place.

rant, where in was this hard word, *Invasion*; repaired to his Rabbi for Solution: he, that the question might seeme somewhat obscure, paused a little, that it might not shame him; after he had consulted, in a stroke or two with his grave-learned beard, replyed; the sense of this word is very plaine, it is *Invasion*, it signifieth *Invasion*; with which the Constable being fully satisfied, gave him many thankes and departed. *Locus* and *spatium corporis locati*, is little better; what have we in this definition, of the intrinsecall nature of place? So that, if I be not wholly blinde, they, whilst they treat of it as Scholars, make it nothing: when they make use of it by  
the

the By, it is the same. As, the Soule, they say, is *tota in toto*, and *tota in qualibet parte*; whilst they spread and diffuse the soule over the whole body, from one extremity to the other, *Place* maketh no division in the soule; it is but one soule, yet extended quite through the body. Angels are *definitivè in loco*; that place which is within the circumference so limited, doth not at all cause them to make two in this angelicall Being.

Time.

I may affirme the same of time, *Tempus est mensura motus*; What doe I know of time by this? how can I from hence ghesse time to have so considerable a Being, as that it shall make two of that whith otherwise

wise would be but one? In the Deity we are sure it can have no such effect. In the Deity wee have creation, preservation, redemption, decree, and execution of that decree. All these to our apprehension are distinguished by time: and yet no man will say, that in God they are two : for God is *purus actus, nulla potentia.*

But you will say ; this is *obscurum per obscurius*, and not to unmask and unveile difficulties: Which no *simile* taken from the Divinity can doe, because That is all mysticall.

To which I answer ; *Si magnis licet componere parva,* wee shall finde the same in our selves, we shall find that

Time

Time doth not at all difference, or any way act. I suppose it is cleare, that Place hath lost all place and credit in this argumentation. Why may not I say the same of Time, seeing by all mens confessions they are twins of the same womb? But secondly, I affirme this, (and I hope truly) that if you make Time any thing, you annihilate all the act of the Creation; that is, you will admit of no one perfect action. A thought, I confess, passeth in a moment; and yet, in this moment, under this moment, are many subdivisions of Time. We have in an hour, an halfe, a quarter, a minute, a second, (the 60 part of a minute:) & how many subdivisions will

All actions  
nothing,  
if time be  
any thing.

a scruple admitt of? For ought I know, Time and *punctum Physicum* agree in this, that they are *divisibilia in infinitum*. If then you will make so many thoughts in a thought, as you have divisions under a scruple, you will have no perfect thought, no compleat act. To shun this, you wil confess that Time doth not divide one act alone: but one Act or thought comprehendeth many Times. Why may nor I say, that if Time doth not parcell our one act, it cannot act upon two, when the duality ariseth onely from Time? This not being well weighed, hath cast our wits upon strange rocks, hath raised this Question,

*How*

The difficulty untied, how God seeth things.

*How doth God see things?* If in their existencies, then all things are co-eternall with God : if in their Causes only, then all things are not present with God ; but you must admit of succession, a former and a latter, to eye divine ; which is blasphemy. This *dilemma* seemeth strong ; but it is because we make Time something : whereas indeed all things did exist in their Beings with God *ab omni eterno*. For, *aeternum & tempus* are all one in eternity : and this succession is but to our apprehension.

Thus, if Time and Place be nothing, I hope the weight of this objection is taken off.

But I foresee another objection.

*Object.* If Time and Place be nothing, if all our Actions are but One : How can there be evill and good?

*Answ.* I fully conclude with *Aristotles Adversaries Anaxagoras, Democritus, &c* That Contradictions may be *simul & semel* in the same Subject, same Instant, same Notion (not onely in two distinct respects, or notions, as one thing may be *causa & effectum, Pater & Filius, respectu diversi*; but even in the same respect, under one and the same Notion.) For, *Non ens* is nothing; and so, the Being which it hath, may subsist with that which contradicts it. I speake in their termes.

Now

Now, let us view our actions, either

as { Many, in pieces, or,  
{ One entire act.

As many ; impute Transgression to what you please, either to the effects in the body, or the Will, and its workings : all these, so farre as they have Being , are good ; for, all Being is good. Where then is the sinne ? Certainly, sinne lieth in this, that there is not so full a goodness as there should. Sin is onely a Privation, a Non-Entity : But, a Privation, a Non-Entity may subsist ( according to the subsistence it hath ) with Being. Such a co-existence of Entity and Non-Entity, was in his faith , who cried, *Lord, I believe, help my unbelief.*

liefe. This Contradiction (of Entity , Non-Entity ) must be in the selfe-same Act, (and not in two distinct Acts: ) else the Act is perfect, (having complete Entity, goodness, without admixture of Non-Entity : ) and so is onely the Creator: or else it is more imperfect than Beelzebub ; for, It is Bad, and no Good, Non-Entity wholly, and no Entity , and so no Action.

Thus we see Good and Evill may co-exist in severall, in particular Actions; Why then not so, if all Acts should bee but one entire Act, undistinguisht by Time or Place? If the members composing the Body, have matter and forme, why then not

not the whole Body? Sinne in it selfe is *nothing*, only a *non-conformity* to Gods Law.

The Twilight hath not so much light and so much positive darknesse: only it hath not so much light as Noon in cleare day. Here's the defect: and by this defect, Light and Darknesse co-exist in the same point of ayre.

So, though our Acts bee but one, undivided by Lime and Place: yet, to our grieve, are not free from Sinne.

Thus the Soule, Truth, Light, is alwayes and continually one, though it appeareth otherwise to me: and this appearance ought not to dazzle the sight of the truth; for, as they say of honour, *Honor est in honore*,

norante: so may I say of apprehension, *Apprehensio est in apprehendente*: the thing is still the same, let my apprehension bee what it will bee.

The same truth taking vari-  
cus shapes in our ap-  
prehensi-  
ons.

Set forth  
by a simili-  
tude ta-  
ken from  
the Sun.

I doe not reject the phrases of severall truths, and several actings of this truth: for, *Loquendum cum vulgo*; yet, phrases must not mislead us. For whilst I confess *loquendum esse cum vulgo*, I profess that *sapiendum est cum paucis*. For, to our apprehension, that truth which is but one, doth vriegate it selfe, and take divers shapes.

As that Sun which is one and the same, is ruddy in the morning, cleere at noone-day; of a moderate heate early, and at mid-day rather torrid.

Various

Various colours meeting in the same point, to make up one indivisible act of sense, are by it judged divers Beings, whereas they all make up but one Being; they are but one and the same object of sense. Reason, which is exalted above Sense, tellet us it must be so; because that act of life is but one, and the Sense is not an Ubiquitary; it cannot act upon any more than one at once.

The Trigonall Glasse paints out to us *more*, and *more lively* colours in every object (which as a *medium* it presents to the eye) *than* are in the Iris; yet, This object, may be but some duskish sad thing, in which there is no change of colours at all.

The same act of sense perfectly one, yet varied unto many formes.

A Similitude from the trigonall glasse.

Sense con-  
futed by  
*Copernicus.*

The three leading Senses have confuted *Copernicus* these many yeares ; for the eye seeth the circulations of the Heavens ; we feele our selves upon a stable and firme foundation ; and our eares heare not from the volutations of the Earth such a black *Cant* as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth : and yet now if we will beleeve our \* new Masters , sense hath done as sense will doe , misguided our Reason .

\* *Copernic.*  
*Kepler.* *Ga.*  
*lileus de*  
*Galil:*

When the nimble juglers play their pranks , you see and heare , yet neither see nor heare . So your sense is no good judge . Thus let the soule be raised to its supreme height of power , and it will cleerely see , that all

all the actings of reason  
which seeme severall ( bee  
they, as we think, distingui-  
shed by time and place ) are  
but one, a fixt entire unity.

### CHAP. XII.

*Another objection is answered,  
drawn from the falsehood in  
the workings of the soule.*

**B**ut if these parti-  
cular actings of  
truth, are truth ;  
then when this Being, which  
wee have so long discour-  
sed of, acteth not truth, it  
ceafeth to bee : and so,  
where the soule entertain-  
eth or pronounceth a false  
position , the soule is no  
more it selfe.

objec.

Grant

Successi-  
on of mo-  
ments, ap-  
parent, not  
reall.

The soule  
never acts  
fally.

Grant that it is with the soule in this moment of time, when it acts upon falsehood, as when it acts not, and so is not ; yet you will advance nothing , till you can prove the succession of moments to have a reall being. By former discourse, I hope it is cleare, that Time is but a Nominall Being, and then this cessation depending on that distinct moment, which is not, is likewise it selfe an imagination.

But secondly, I will allow it, when any man can shew me that Falshood is a reall being, which the soule or truth can worke upon; For, in every apprehension two things are to be weighed ; The Agent it selfe, and the Subject acted upon, ( I speake

speake now in other mens language ; for I conceive the Agent together with the Subject to be One in the act.) Truth is alwayes truth, *Nemine dubitante* ; and so it must be true,whilst it a<sup>t</sup>teth on a truth. If that be True, which it acts upon, then all is well ; if it be False, it is a vanity, a lye, a nothing. For, if Falshood have a Being, then wee must either with the Manichees, make Two sources of Being , or else God must be the author of it ; which no man will affirme.

If then it have no Being, the Soule cannot act in it, and so it cannot be the act of the Soule; For, how shall the soule or truth act upon nothing ?

But

*Object.*

*Resp.*  
In false  
propositi-  
ons of the  
soule, so  
farre as it  
acts, it acts  
truly :  
where it  
is deceiv-  
ed, it is  
by not  
acting.

But the Soule doth act,  
when it pronounceth a false  
position?

He that in the twilight,  
mistaketh a man for a tree,  
acteth right in what he see-  
eth ; and when he raiseth a  
false conclusion upon the  
premisses, he acteth not.  
For, how is it possible, that  
a man should act falsehood,  
a vanity, nothing ?

In this action, there are  
two things; There is the see-  
ing a Being, and the seeing  
it under a confused notion.  
Or, which is the same,

You may observe, first, the  
opining ; secondly, the op-  
ining uncertainly or falsly.

The opining, is a good  
act, none will deny; to think,  
let it be what it will be,  
is good.

But

But secondly, the so-thinking, is that which is obscure. Now certainly, the *formalis ratio* of this so-thinking, lyeth in thinking of error, which is nothing ; and in thinking of nothing, the soule cannot act ; for, nothing produceth nothing.

A man, who catcheth at the shadow of a Hornet, acteth rightly in catching, and stingeth not himselfe; because he apprehendeth onely the shadow ; because so far he doth not act ; for to catch a shadow, to catch nothing, and not to act, are *idem*. And thus, whilst the soule catcheth at a false position, it graspeth but the shadow, which can be nothing, seeing evill is nothing,

Paine hath  
no reall  
Being.

thing; *ergo*, it loseth not truth; for it pronounceth nothing but the truth of the position.

The same may be said for *Paine*. I conceive, it cannot act upon the soule, nor the soule upon it, because, it is but a bare privation of spirit and strength. And upon this ground, I shall subscribe to that opinion propounded by that reverend, worthy, that quick-sighted Balearian-jaculator, Mr Dr *Twisse*: Whether it be not better to be in perpetuall paine, than not to be at all. If *Paine* be but a bare privation, certainly Any Being is more desirable, than, for feare of a privation (a non-being) to become no-Being.

*Hic*

Mart.lib.2.  
Epigr.80.

*Hic rogo, non furor est, ne moriare, mori?* If any man shall tell me I speak against sense, I shall modestly ask him this Question: Whether it be not *impar congres-sus* betwixt Sense and Reason: and whether, in that case, Sense be an equall judge. Reason telleth us, that *Paine* must either be something, or nothing; if *nothing*, then it is but a privation; if *something*, it must be either good, or evill; if *good*, it cannot (as hath, and will yet appeare more in this Pamphlet) hurt us; if *evill*, it is either a *nominall* evill, or *real*; if it be named an evill, and is not, it will not be disputed; but if it be a *Reall* evill, then it is nothing; for, *Evill*, by consent

sent of all, is nothing but privation of good. In this case shall Reason or Sense guide, judge You.

### C H A P. X I I I.

*Discovering the consequences  
of this Position, that All  
things are one Truth.*

S I R,

W HEN you collect your thoughts, and passe sentence upon these unsheaved gleanings, your gentlenes (though the papers merit no such favour) wil smile upon them; and say, here our eyes indeed are pleased with the curiosity of *Pallas* her needle: but, what hath Reason to work upon?

upon? what is the usefulness of this more than *A-rachne's web*? more than to entangle empty wits with all? What fruit doth it yeeld better than the Silk-worme, which is worne only for ostentation? Give me leave to plead for my own. Our own (you know, though black) is comely to Our selves.

If This were well weighed, that all things are but one emanation from power divine: If this were taken fully into the Understanding, that wee might be said to live upon, to live in this truth; we should live more Christianly, more cheerfully.

*Non est vivere, sed valere,  
vita.*

The hap-piness of our lives advanced by this o-pinion.

*Mart. li.s.  
Ep. 70.*

I say more cheerfully, more Christianly, in a few moments, than we doe now in the whole course of our distracted time. And you will more easily consent to this, if you doe consider that our happiness is compounded of two Simples only, which are so entwined, as that they may seeme One,

The first is to *know*.

The second, to *doe* what is right and good.

Of the former, the Theoreticall part, I shall speake hereafter. In the Practick, Two things are considerable,

*First*, that Action dependeth wholly upon knowledge. And, of Knowledge, this is the well-spring and rule, that, *Vnity is all*. The Spirit

This Vnity  
the foun-  
taine of  
knowledg.

Spirit saith, *How can you love whom you doe not know?* and I may say, *How can you do what you know not?*

The Not-knowledge of of what is right, with-holdeth from, and wearieth in action; if perchance wee ever have any glimmering of light. For, *Ignorance bringeth this double evill with it.*

First, it leadeth into Errour; and Errour (simply in the view of it) giveth no content.

Secondly, in the progresse it wearieth and distracteth. One who is lost in a Wood, suffereth as much in seeking as losing the way. Whereas, if we Knew aright, how even and smooth would be the way of action, and how great

Action  
wholly de-  
pends on  
knowledg.

great our contents therin?

Secondly, not only all our actions turn upon this hinge; but out of this treasury issueth forth the whole complacency that wee gather from, or receive in action. For, if wee knew this truth, that all things are one; how cheerfully, with what modest courage should wee undertake any action, re-incounter any occurrence, knowing that that distinction of misery and happiness, which now so perplexeth us, hath no Being, except in the Brain? Wee should not need to check and raise our selves with Davids out-cryes, *why art thou cast downe my soule, why art thou disquieted within me?* Our Spirits could

could with him wait upon God ; make him our only rock, and then wee should not be moved. We should not call for *Epicetus* nor *Boëtius de consolatione Philosophicâ*; wee might fetch our cures from our own bosomes, if from this one truth of unity wee could conclude these two things.

First, that Misery is nothing, and so cannot hurt.

Secondly , that every thing that is, is good, and good to me : then we might sing with a joyfull spirit, *O nimium, nimiumque beati* ; and upon sure ground ; for, whilst I being a Being, am Good, and that other Being is Good, and these Two Goods can fall under no other difference, but of degrees,

grees; Good & Good, can-  
not but agree, and so must  
be good to me.

*Ob.*

If any man shall say, that  
the overflowing of another  
mans good, may be my e-  
vill; they mis-take; for, such  
a thought is a falsehood; and,  
as I have already proved,  
Falsehood is nothing, and so  
cannot hurt.

*Risپ.*

That such a thought is  
falsehood, I suppose this  
will cleare it.

The Philosophers fancy  
to themselves *animam mun-  
di*, and say every parcell is  
as a Simple contributing to  
the existence of that *Compo-  
situm*. But Christians know,  
and I have(if I mistake not)  
evinced, that, all Being is  
*but one emanation from above*,  
diversified onely in our ap-

*pre-*

prehension. How can then one piece of that Being impeach the other, one part of the Soule quarrell with the other? As the *will* (speaking in their termes) with the *sensitive faculty*; or the Eye with the *Belly*: the vanity whereof *Eſop* hath taught us long agoe. So, of necessity, if either my *envy*, or another's *folly*, lay me low, because my brother is exalted, this must be a lie, and so cannot hurt. *E contrario*, the Good of another, being the perfection of the whole, is my advantage. If with this eye you view that Scripture, you will see it in its glory, *Is thine eye evill, because thy brothers good increaseth?*

All things  
one piece.

Mat.20.15

The rule, you see is, that I should rejoice at the well-

G fare

Propriety  
maketh  
lovely.

fare of another. Now what is the reason of the rule? Philosophy teacheth us, that it is not onely *αγαντος*, but *ιδιον*, that is, *lovely*. If then I must rejoice, I rejoice because of some propriety, and this propriety ariseth from *Vnity*; this Alkermes of Unity, cheereth the drooping spirit, cureth the *atra bilis* of Melancholy. The same potion easeth the heart of envyings, censorings and whisperings. So he, who knoweth that injuries, because they are nothing, cannot hurt; and good things, though anothers, doe serve him; cannot cherish such viperous starvelings in his thoughts.

**C H A P.**

CHAP. XIII.

The benefit which Knowledge  
and all Sciences receive from  
this assertion.

**H**ave in a word showne how Unity untyeth all difficulties, unites all happinesse in *practicall* things. Permit me to discover what influence it hath upon that other simple, which maketh up the compound of our happinesse, (*scil.*) *Theorie*.

Tully saith of *Epicurus*,  
*Frangit, non dividit*; The breaking of learning into so many Sciences, is but making so many miles, that so the Master may have more hire for his post-

The vanity of dividing knowledg into many Sciences.

G 2 horse.

horse. They forget, that,  
*vita est brevis*, whilst *ars est longa*. It were much better if all Learning were like the chaine fastned at *Jupiters* Throne, all of a piece: Or the Beame, which from the Sunne by a continuall tract of irradiation toucheth the treasures of the earth.

To the effecting of this, that learned, that mighty man *Comenius* doth happily and rationally indeavour to reduce *all* into *one*. Why doe wee make Philosophy and Divinity two Sciences? What is True Philosophy but Divinity? and if it be not True, it is not Philosophy.

Doe but see a little in particulars, the fruit of such like divisions. •

Confus-  
ions from  
division in  
knowledg.

It

In the knowledge of Beings, we must observe

First, that, Being is :

Secondly, What it is.

There is the *is*, and the *not*. What a tedious work doth this very division lay upon us? Alas, the very first, the easiest part of it, will take up all our time; and to ascend to causes before we know that there are effects, is to mount the highest round, before we ascend the first. And therefore that learned wit, Sir Francis Bacon, in his naturall Philosophy, bringeth onely experiments, leaving the search of causes to those, who are content, with *Icarus*, to burne their wings at a fire too hot for them. Indeed, sometimes as an embellish-

Knowledg  
double, of  
Beings, &  
of their  
Causes.

Knowledg  
of Beings  
twofold,  
of their  
existen-  
cies, and  
heir na-  
tures.

ment of his discourse, that he may please stirring fancy, he interlaceth some causes, yet gently and modestly propoundeth them, but as for entertainment. If now our humble spirits could be content to see all things, as they are, but one, onely bearing different shapes, we should according to that rule, *Noli altum sapere*, improve in what we know, and there sit downe. But our spirits are mighty *Nimrods*, hunting after knowledge, venturing all, to eate of the tree of knowledge of good and evill. Which curiositie of ours, is wittily reproved by Sir John Davies;

*Why did my Parents send  
me to the Schooles,  
That*

That I with knowledg might  
enrich my minde :  
When the desire to know,  
first made men fooles.  
And did corrupt the root  
of all mankinde.

And for this reason we lose  
with Esops Dog , the sub-  
stance, and get not the sha-  
dow.

Causes we cannot, neither  
shall ever finde out : The  
knowledg of existencies we  
omit ; they are too volumi-  
nous, if we did attempt ; and  
so much doubted of by men,  
that what to think, we know  
not. View all Learning, and  
see how the very Being of  
things, is questioned in Na-  
turall Philosophy. Amongst  
the Quadrupedes , wee que-  
stion the existence of the

Knowledg  
of existen-  
cies necef-  
sary , but  
altogether  
uncertain.

Unicorne : *inter volatilia*,  
the Phœnix, and the Bird of  
Paradise : amongst *Fishes*,  
the Mer-maid. When we  
seek into *Minerals*, we finde  
not *Ebur fossile*; the incom-  
parable vertues of it wee  
meet with in all Physicians :  
but the subject of so many  
excellencies, we doubtful-  
ly hope for. Of *herbes* and  
*plants*, Bookes name many  
which gardens, meadowes,  
rivers afford not : If they  
ever were, we may give them  
to *Pancirolla*, that he may  
reckon them with *perpetu-  
um mobile*, the Philosophers  
stone, *cum multis alijs, inter  
Inuenta perdita* : For every  
age interreth old things,  
and is againe fertile of new  
births.

If we were mighty men,

as

as Adam, that all the creatures would come and present themselves to our view: yet ( which is the second part of this first Question ) wee could not give them their names according to their natures. For when we doe know that any Being doth exist, we doe not know what their formes, their severall qualities and temperaments are. We altogether are ignorant of herbes and plants; which are hot and cold, in how many degrees they are so. For in these, how many, how eternall are the debates? Some deny the healing vertue to *Dictamnum*. Some question the nature of that killing-savvng Indian herb, Hen-man-bane, *Tobacco*: whose insolence is

knowledg  
of the na-  
tures more  
uncertain  
than the  
existen-  
cies.

such, as to make That part of man a chimney, an outlet of her smoky birth (expressed happily by Doctor Tho-  
ry in these words, *Inq; tubo genitas baurire & reddere nubes:*) I say, to make That an outlet of her smoky birth, by which the old Romans (in this their Proverb, *Est homo nasutus*) discovered their judgements of *gifs* and *wit*. Some say it is hot, and some say it is cold. Few of the Learned consent about the degrees of heat and cold in any Simple, and so are forced to palliate all with the gaudy mantle of *occulta qualitas*; Yet what are all these but matter of observation ? manifest effects, which Sense teacheth the plowman, the Country-  
man,

man, yea the bruites themselves, as familiarly, as warmth in the Sun-shine, and wet in the Raine. I could name many questions in \* Politickes, Oeconomickes, Ethickes, &c. the very subject whereof are in dispute. But they will more happily fall in, when I discover our ignorance in causes.

\* As all those laws concerning slaves, whereas a slave indeed is *non ens*, for if any man have given

away, with *Esaï*, his birth-right, yet he hath not lost it; because manhood and religion are not *mei juris*; they are talents which G d hath intrusted me with, and are no more deputable, than places of *judicatu:e*. *Et sic de ceteris.*

Thus you see in what a Maze you are Meandred, if you admit of any division. The very knowledge of the Being of things, is more than we are capable of. And as yet that is necessary,

In what sense Knowldg of Beings is to be wished.

sary, so we keepe our selves still to this principle, that those things are all of one nature, variegated only in our apprehension: and this knowledge I must consent to.

But if men once seeke into the *Causes* of Subsistencies, I see no reason but they should suffer as *Rei læse Majestatis*. For these are *Arcana Imperii*, which to meddle with, is no lesse than high Treason.

C H A P.

CHAP. XV.

*Confusion in the knowledge  
of Causes, discovered, and  
redressed by this Vnity.*

**I**F wee are thus at a stand, in these very beginnings, what shall wee bee, when wee enquire after Causes? Two lie open to our view. First, our great and good God, the fountaine of all Being, and this the Ancients styled *Fatum*.

Secondly, there is that Emanation from him; which is the first created cause of all Being, and this was Aristotle's *materia prima*, so far as sensible things extend.

Which

Two only causes received,  
God, and emanation from  
God.

Aristotle's  
*materia prima*  
brought  
to light.

Which because it is the substance of all things, and the variations of it make all formes; therefore in it selfe, he described it to be neither quid, quale, nor quantum.

All other causes are better knowne by name, than in the natures of them. They make many, as *Efficient*, *Finall*, *Materiall*, *Formall*; with divers subdistinctions; as instrumentall, exemplary, &c. All these have matter and forme. For, there is a matter, and forme of a materiall cause, and forme and matter of formall causes. For in a table of wood, the materiall cause is not the matter, wood: wood is the subject, upon which this materiall cause bringeth forth that effect, a Table.

Matter &  
Forme  
have their  
matter and  
forme,  
both of  
which  
meet in  
the emanation.

a Table. It may bee the materiall cause shall not be Physicall matter; wee shall by and by finde it another name.

Of the forme of a materiall cause, I shall say nothing, and so for formall causes.

Faith is said to be the forme of a Christian, and faith hath its forme. The soule is by many deémed (which I understand not) the forme of the reasonable creature, and it hath a particular individuall forme. And thus both materiall and formall causes have matter and forme.

Matter againe, is either *Physicall* and substantiall, or metaphoricall and *metaphysicall*. And this is the name  
I pro-

I promised even now.

Formes are either intrinsecall, or extrinsecall : the intrinsecall are Logicall, Metaphysicall, &c.

Now have you various and severall kinds of forms; but who knoweth the least considerable part of matter or forme? Who will not cleerly lose himselfe in such an inquest? May we not say of these, what one saith wittily of the Soule?

*For, Her true forme, how can  
my sparke discerne,  
which dim by nature, Art  
did never cleere :  
When the great wits, of whom  
all skill we learne,  
Are ignorant, both what  
she is, and where?*

Doe but survey the Phy-  
sicall Beings of our Philo-  
sophers, with what impos-  
sible, with what unnecessary  
scrutinies of causes, do they  
weary themselves, and their  
Disciples?

The vaine  
search of  
causes in  
Physicks.

Till *numeri Platonici* cease  
to be a Proverb, I must re-  
maine a Sceptick, although  
one undertake to teach me,  
*how and whence it is,* that *va-  
rious rowlings of the tongue,*  
shall send forth so many ar-  
ticulate voices, and so ma-  
ny severall languages.

Till it be known, how all  
numbers gather themselves  
into an Unity, I must not  
give credence to another,  
who promiseth an accompt  
of the estuation of the Sea.

I know some surrender  
*Neptunes Trident* to the  
Moone,

\*Platonici; who make the world animal magnum. Vide Gal. in System. Ptolem. & Co-pernic. Kepfers Harmo.

Moone, and there fix the reason of *Thetis* her uncertain ebbings. Others \*give the world a good paire of lungs, and from these Bellowes expect the causes of what they inquire for. Others take a dish of water, and shaking it up and down, think to cleere this difficulty. But these their ratiocinations discover cleerly, that with N o A H s Dove, through over-much water, they can finde no ground for footing. For *veritas non querit angulos*. And if the reason were ready, they would not have disputed; and yet they are very confident; and why may not they be so, who dare venture to give ( before they prove any Orbs ) the government of the

the Orbs to a band of celestiall intelligences ?

I shall not wonder, if these men every where finde an Euripus , and at its bankes imitate their Grandy's\* outcry, *Quia ego non possum te capere, tu me capias.*

Aristot.

How doth the Spirit befoole these men? First hee telleth them, that they are so farre from finding out the Causes, that they are ignorant of the Effects : *Knowest thou the time when the wild Goats of the rock bring forth? or canst thou mark when the Hindes doe calve? Canst thou number the moneths that they fulfill, or knowest thou the time when they bring forth?*

Job 39.1,2.

Salomon saith, There are three things too wonderfull for

Prov. 30.  
18. 19.

for me; yea, fowre which I know  
not. The way of an Eagle in  
the aire, the way of a serpent  
upon a rocke, the way of a ship  
in the midſt of the ſea, and the  
way of a man with a maid.

S: c Ariftot.  
*de mundo,*  
*de caelo &c.*

How doth our great Maſter perplexe himſelfe in  
the inquiry of causes? Sometimes he makes the  
principia of naturall things,  
to be contraria: whereas,  
neither the heavens, nor the  
ſtarres, nor anything that is  
by univocall generation, is  
that way produced. Some-  
times he allowes three prin-  
cipia, *Privatio, Materia, &*  
*Forma*; forgetting his own  
principle, that *Ex nihilo ni-*  
*hil fit*, not remembraſing that  
when hee hath matter and  
forme, he is yet to ſeek for  
the Rock and Pit, out of  
which

which matter and form are  
digged and hewed ; and  
therefore instituteth two  
severall authors, one of mat-  
ter, another of forme.

I confesse, his Commenta-  
tors doe file of some rust  
from these Tenets , but not  
so cleerely as to make him  
give the right cause of Be-  
ing.

*Romance's and New-At-  
lantides*, I shall gladly em-  
brace as pleasant and glori-  
ous entertainements from  
specious and Ambrosian  
wits. But for true know-  
ledge of causes , having no  
cause to expect , I will  
not hope.

Like Pla-  
to's and sir  
Francis Ba-  
con's.

Sis *Walter Raleigh* saith  
exceeding well , that the  
Cheese-wife knoweth that  
Runnet curdleth Cheese,  
but

but the Philosopher knoweth not how.

All this while I doe not reject an industrious search after wisedome, though the wisest of men faith, *He that increaseth wisedome, increaseth griefe.*

*Verulan:  
Augment.  
Scient.*

I doe only, with Sir Francis Bacon, condemne doctrinam phantasticam, litigiosam, fucatam, & mollem; a nice, unnecessary , prying into those things which profit not.

Too great exactnesse in this Learning , hath caused our Meteorologists to blush when their confidence hath proved but a Vapour. Too great hopes of discovering the mysterie of nature, hath caused some, contrary to the authority of Scripture contrar-

contrary to the opinion of *Iulius Cæsar*, *Picus Mirandula*, *Cornelius à Lapide*, *Ioan. Barclaius*, cum multis aliis, to attribute an unwarranted power to the starres over our bodies.

But this ensueth , while we follow, for learning, what is not. And so, that noble comprehensive activity, the soule of man , is hindered from entertaining in its place more generous, more usefull , and sublimated Truths.

How would the soule improve , if all *Aristotles Materia prima*, *Plato's Mens Platonica*, *Hermes Trismegistus* his *νοῦς & λόγος*, were converted into some spiruall light ? the soule might soare and raife it selfe up to Univer-

Universall Being, bathe it selfe in those stately, deep, and glorious streames of *Vnity*, see *God in Iesus Christ*, the first, chiefe, and sole cause of *all Being*: It would not then containe it selfe within particular rivulets, in whose shallow waters it can encounter nothing but sand or pebbles, seeing it may fully delight it selfe in the first rise of all delight, *Iesus Christ*.

Thus, when you see the face of Beauty, you will perfectly be assured how many the severall pieces which make it up, must be, what their nature, and their severall proportions. So shall you with certainty descend to knowledge of existences, essences, when you shall

shall rest in one universall cause : and Metaphysicks, Mathematicks, and Logick will happily prove one, while they teach the variations of *Vnity* through severall numbers. All particular Sciences will be subordinate, and particular applications of these. So all shall be, according to *Ficinus*, *Circulus boni per bonum in bonum rediens*; and the face of divine Beauty shall bee unveiled through all.

H

CHAP.

## C H A P. X V I.

*The unhappy traits of Division, in other parts of Learning, made manifest.*

*Ast your eye on Morall Philosophy, and see how the truth is darkened by distinctions and divisions ; How our Masters have set up in the same soule , Two fountains of Reason , the will, and the Understanding. Have they not virtutes Intellectuales & Morales ? Is it not a great question, *Vtrum Prudentia sit virtus Moralis ? Vtrum Summum Bonum sit in Intellectu, an Voluntate ? Vtrum Prudentia possit separari à virtute Morali ? Vtrum virtus Moralis sita sit in Appetitu Rationali,**

nali, an Sensitive?

I say, these questions, especially the dividing of the soule into so many faculties, enthrones many reasonable Beings in the soule. For, when the will entertaineth or rejecteth the proposition of the understanding, shee must doe it one of these three wayes: Either by an instinct; and this men will not have; for, *hoc est brutum*. Or by chance; and this many reject; for then she hath no liberty. Or by discourse; and this most pitch upon; for then she doth exetcise *vim illam imperatricem*, which I reade of amongst them, but understand not.

Now, if they conclude upon this *third* way. What

Many reasonable Beings, placed by Philosophy in the Soule.

H 2 is

is this Discourse, but the Work of an *Vnderstanding*? if the *will* act that way, which is, or ought to be to the *Vnderstanding* proprium quarto modo; Is not then the *will* an *Vnderstanding*?

Thus like an unskillfull Artist, they mince with distinctions; they *whet*, till there be no more *Steele*: and whilst they would *sharpen*, they *annihilate*: Whilst they would inlarge, they overthrow the Soule. They create names, and say, with *Ajax*, they are *Vlysses*, and so fight with them. They do, as one faith very well, giving *Passion* eyes, make Reason blind; raising the *will*, they ruine the *Vnderstanding*. *Termini nulos*

Eurip.  
Traged.

*los habent terminos.* The poore Soule oppressed with black Melancholy, beleeveth some part of his body as big as a house: and no man can, in his thought, passe, unlesse he remove it: Even so doe those men.

But what may not bee expected from That happy Inventer, and bold Abetter of errors, who with much confidence maintaineth the eternity of the World, against *Hermes, Museus, Orpheus, Anaxagoras, Linus, &c.* Yet that they may *insanire cum ratione*, they say, that if you raise not up some faculty to contend with the *Vnderstanding*, the *Vnderstanding* seeing right, must ever do right, and

H 3      that

that we by wofull experience know to bee otherwise.

I confess,whilst the *Vnderstanding* seeth light and right (I now discourse of the *Vnderstanding, Will, Affections, &c.* in their termes) it doth right ; for, seeing and doing is all one ; for the act of the Soule is but seeing or discerning. But that *Vnderstanding*, which now did see right perfectly , at the same instant is blind , even in a grosse, absurd thing : and so the effect and birth of it is but darknesse and folly.

Seeing  
and doing  
one in the  
Soule as  
knowing  
and willing.

Vanity of  
disputes in  
Metaphy-  
sicks.

In Metaphysicks, with what curious nets do they intangle their hearers ? certainly,that should be stiled the Art or Science of Disputes

sputes and quære's ; for the very Being and *subjectum Metaphysices*, is strongly disputed. Some will have *ens tantum*, the universall nature of *Being* : Others, substances abstract from matter, as Angels, Spirits, Soules of men, to bee the subject of this Learning ; And as it beginneth, so it groweth into thousands of disputes.

As, *Vtrum differentiae possunt esse sub eodem genere cum illo quod differre faciunt?* *Vtrum universale sit aliquid reale, in notionale tantum?* *Vnde rerum individuatio exoriatur?*

If I should go through Logick, *Mediocrem artem*, Mathematicall Sciences: I should but weary you with

H 4 variety

Darknesse  
in Divini-  
ty through  
the igno-  
rance of  
unity.

Faith and  
Repen-  
tance coe-  
vall.

variety of opinions.

Even *Divinity* it selfe is darkened with mists of inextricable questions. The questions about *Faith* and *Love*, are sufficient to fill the world with perpetuall quarrels ; As, whether *Faith* precedeth *Repentance*? which learned Master *Pemble* hath sweetly determined by making both *Faith* and *Repentance* fruits of *semen vivificum*. Whether *Faith* be a particular application of *Christ* to my selfe, or onely a bare spirituall beleefe, that *Christ* is the Son of *God*? Which Reverend, holy, learned Master *Cotton*, hath most acutely, most truly cleared, by proving that *Faith* can bee nothing but

a laying hold of that promise which God hath made. Now, that promise is, *That, he that believeth that Christ is the Sonne of God, shall be saved.*

The ge-  
nerall  
promise,  
the object  
of faith.

Whether faith be a believing that I am saved, or depending upon God for salvation? And here *Bellarmino* hath with mighty wit assaulted our side; for, saith he, if belief be to believe I am saved, I was saved without faith. If belief be to believe that God will give me grace to be saved, I believe before I have grace, before I have faith. Which knot, I know not how to dissolve, but by opening with Reverend Mr. Cotton That (and this is another Quere.)

*Declarative*

We are saved by faith, only declarative. I am saved, not only in the eternall decree, without faith, by Gods free gift ( that all consent to ) but even in the execution. And when God hath pleased to take me out of eternall darknesse ; then faith discovereth to me that I am to be saved ; and so, making faith to be a manifestation of that to me, that I am saved, Bellarmine's objection is answered.

There are many other Questions, but I dare not so much as mention them.

If wee should but survey the disciplinable part of Divinity, we should be confounded with Chiliads of disputes, all which I will wrap up in one, scil.

Whether

Whether there be a prescript forme of Church-government?

Are not the two Testaments expositors of the two Tables? Do they leave us any latitude in any other of the Commandements? why should we then think, that *That Commandement* which God hath honoured in the second place, should be forgotten? Truly, had the Learned Papists so done, they would never have expunged it.

Are not we as unable to prescribe the *manner* as the *matter* of Gods worship? If we were left to our selves, should wee not institute *cringings*, *crouchings*, all those ceremonies of *will-worship*, which carry a voluntary

The ill  
conse-  
quence of  
the divisi-  
on be-  
tween do-  
ctrine and  
discipline.

*Doctrine*  
of matter  
in worship;  
*Discipline*  
of manner,  
both are  
Doctrine,  
both pre-  
scribed b:  
the same  
God.

The mon-  
strous ef-  
fects of  
division  
made man-  
ifest in  
other pe-  
ces of Di-  
vinity.

Inntry outward visible shew  
of humility , but give the  
heart leave to play the  
Trewant? If ever distinc-  
tions did harm, here they have  
beene deadly poyson: for,  
Doctrine and Discipline are  
all one. For, what is *Dis-*  
*cipline* but that Doctrine  
of the manner of Gods wor-  
ship? wherein we ought to  
bee as faithfull, as in any  
point of Divinity: and this  
will certainly appeare one  
day, when God shall with  
pittylesse holy scorne, aske  
*some*, Who hath required  
these things at your hands?

But, to conclude; give  
me leave to shew you how  
these exorbitant wits have  
raised a *Babel*, have cast *Pel-*  
*lion* upon *Offa*; and from  
thence discharged the Ba-  
listæ

listē of their ignorance, against the Throne of Eternity, against God himselfe.

The Schooles for many ages, have looked upon the way of Gods knowledge of things, under two notions ; *simplicis intelligentiae, & pure visionis.* I confess, I see not the end of this distinction. For, if Gods Power and will be all one, (which I think no man disputeth) all the wayes of knowledge, that can bee in God, must bee confined in that one notion of *simplicis intelligentiae.*

The weak-  
nesse of  
the distin-  
ction *Sci-  
entia sim-  
plicis intel-  
ligentiae, &  
pure visio-  
nis.*

I doe seeme (if I mistake not) to maintaine this position by an evident demonstration, thus ;

Is there any that denyeth  
God to be *purus actus* ? doth  
not

not every body say, that in God there is no *potentia*? If God then bee *actus*, and not *potentia*, all things were, that ever shall be, *ab eterno* under a decree; and so, what hee could doe, hee did doe, and can doe no more.

Yet, that Truths may come more cleerely and easily to our apprehension, I shall allow the use of the distinction, so that they improve it only for *memory*, and doe not expect any *reality* from it.

But some, not content with this distinction, have found out another, which discovereth a meane parentage, by the very name, it is called *Media scientia*. I will not contend with it in the

the power of those arguments, whereby our Divines have so often left it spiritlesse and helplesse. I shall only from this point of Unity, shew the vanity of it.

If this *sciencia* be one with that which wee allow, then is it but nominall and vaine. If it be different, you make two in God: for, if I over-value not my former ratiocination, I have proved it cleerely that *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* carrieth forth as much of God as is discernable to our darknesse; and making two in God, you exalt two Gods; and whilst you finde two Gods, you lose the true God, which is but only one, an eternall Unity. And thus whilst men gaze  
conti-

continually in search of causes, they blinde themselves, and know not effects.

## C H A P. X V I I.

A Recapitulation of former instances, with some additions of a question or two more.

In what sense intermediate causes may be allowed.

**I** Confesse there is a secondary intermediate Being, which you may call a Cause; which in our language, doth precede and produce another; the observation of which, is very fitting, so that wee search and puzzle not our selves with the grounds and Reasons of this precedency.

As,

As, apply fire to combustible matter, and it will burn; and if you call (which in some sense you may call) this application, the cause of burning: I dispute not onely the search into the nature of wood and fire, and how the fire doth work upon the wood, and how the wood can be both passive and active, *Simul & Semel*; for, they say, *Nulla est actio quin sit reactio*, this is That I desire to shun; for, *intus extens prohibet alienum*; whilst we entertain our selves with these poore Sophismes of wit, we lose that glory which the immortall soule thirsts after.

But if our spirits, and the light of our reason be dim; Let us goe to the forge of the

Division  
the policy  
of the  
Prince of  
darknesse.

the Philistines, and sharpen our inventions, our apprehensions there; Let us learn from the Prince of the aire, who (knowing well, that, dissolve the *fasciculus*, and *In-gurtha* his prophecy to his children will prove true) taught his Scholars this lesson for these many ages, *Divide & impera; Divisions and distractions, being the great road of all errore.*

And if you long, with the Israelites, to have a King, as your neighbours have; and you desire to speak in their language: When the soule entertaineth light, say it doth *understand*. When it doth exercise any morall virtue, say it *willeth*. When you see some things precede others, call the one a *cause*,

Recapitu-  
lation of  
all.

cause, the other an effe<sup>t</sup>: but travell not far in the search of the source of this cause. Doe not make the will and the understanding two faculties, *Fratrum concordia rara;* *Jacob* will supplant *Esaū* in the Womb. Make therefore the severall Actings of the soule, as Rayes of this one soule; make these rayes, and the soule sending forth these rayes, a perpetuall emanation Divine: and so by these degrees of truth, mount up into the armes of Eternity, and he will take care of you, that you shall not dash your feete against the stone of free will: that you shall not overthrow all faith, by starting so many nice questions in the point of faith.

If

Division  
the policy  
of the  
Prince of  
darknesse.

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Recapitulation of all.

If

If you follow this rule, and see all things in the glasse of Unity, you will not lose all Arts and Sciences in the Wood of Divisions and Subdivisions *in infinitum*; you shall be more substantiall, than to make Substance and Accidents Two; neither will it ever happen, that you maintaine transubstantiation, by affirming that Accidents can haerere in nullo subiecto.

You shall not make to your selfe a God of contradiction, dividing the *will* and *power* of God. Both which in God, is God; and so but *one*. You will not maintaine two Covenants, one of workes, another of grace, seeing grace is gracelesse without workes, and Works

## Works worthlesse without grace.

If God shall give you to walke by this light, practi-call questions will be laid aside, as well as Theoreti-call : you will not dispute whether you ought to be more holy on one day (as at a Sacrament) then at other times ; for, you will then know, that these Scriptures expresse fully the rule you must walke by ; *Pray continually; rejoice evermore: blessed is he that feareth alwayes: Be ye holy [not by fits and starts, but] as I am holy; serving me alwayes, with all your heart, your might, your affections.* So that every day, every duty, is to you an holy day, an ordinance divine.

And

The sense  
of the  
Sabbaths  
command.

And if any man shall say,  
Why doth God adde this  
parcell, Remember that thou  
keep holy the Sabbath day, &c.  
and this strict injunction,  
before you approach the  
Table of the Lord, Let every  
man examine himself, and so  
let him eat?

You will be able to an-  
swer, that you ought not to  
be more holy in one day, in  
one duty, than in another;  
for, you must be all one, *Sem-  
per idem.*

And secondry, you will  
be able to prove, that the  
weight of this injunction, is  
not to adde any other hol-  
iness to the day, or the ordi-  
nance, than a holiness of se-  
paration.

For, a holiness of inha-  
rence, cannot fall any  
where,

where, but upon a reasonable creature. The Temple had no more.

For, with the leave of learned and holy Master Cawdry, Time & Place are incapable of any other sanctification.

But the stresse of these and the like precepts, lyeth here. We ought indeed alwayes to keepe a Sabbath. Every bread and every wa-  
ter, ought to be a confirma-  
tion of our faith and of our  
graces.

But God considering that we are lower than the Angels ( and them hee hath charged with folly;) that we are infirme ; that we cannot alwayes keep the bow bent : If we cannot be holy all the weeke, if we cannot be pure at our own Tables ; as who can ?

All things  
Ordinan-  
ces.

The inten-  
tion of spe-  
ciall Ordin-  
ances.

can ? yet, if we will remember the Sabbath, and if wee will come to that feast of marrow and fatnesse with a wedding-garment , and at other times doe our best (though weak ) indeavours, he will behold no iniquity in us.

We shall not be perplexed, how farre we ought to mourne for the sinnes of others, the sinnes of the times, or our owne lives, [And these are intangling questions to many sweet spirits. ] For, drawing all things to an unity, we shall know that sorrow and joy may meet in the same subject at once ; they must be both in the actings of faith. Wee must not sorrow as without hope; We may not lose

Mourning  
and joy  
reconciled.

lose our Faith in our teares ;  
Our teares must be teares of  
joy ; Wee may think, that  
we have sinned, and so sigh ;  
but at the same instant, wee  
must know we have a Savi-  
our, and so triumph. And if  
I were now all gore blood,  
would I not now goe to the  
Chirurgians ? Truly the grea-  
ter my sin, the sooner ought  
to be my return, the higher  
my Faith. But great and  
inlarged Faith, cannot be  
without exultation and ma-  
gnificats.

Thus could we lay aside  
foolish questions, could we  
seek into our hearts, accord-  
ing to the Poets advice,  
*Ne te quæsiveris extra*, and  
not into the causes, and the  
Being of causes, things too  
high for us ; We might have

an Heaven here, we might see how Christ is one with God, and wee one with Christ ; so wee in Christ, one with God.

If wee cannot reach the perfection of this knowledge, yet let us come as neare it as we can, for the true knowledge of God in Christ, is life everlasting.

( $\therefore$ )

28 MR 59

A



## A Postscript.

**A**ND now, Sir, I have with what brevity I can, run through, what I never intended to speake of. I had prepared a little in lieu of This, upon the nature of *Prophecy*, which I now shall reserve for a Discourse upon the fourteenth Chapter of the second to Corinth: But it was with me in this case, as it is with the soule, prostrating it selfe at the throne of grace. It designes to breath it selfe out in confession, but is suddenly raised up in

to sweet exultation. It intends a *Magnificat*, but by some unexpected irresistible power, it is dissolved into teares; which never did, nor ever can happen in a *Forme*, as might appeare by ventila-  
ting the oppofit arguments, if opportunity prevailed as well as reafon.

I had nothing in my reſo-  
lution, but, by a word or  
two, to mediate in the be-  
halfe of these lines, a free  
and a friendly acceſſe, to  
Your more ſerious and uſe-  
full ſtudies. But (*quo fato  
nescio*) I have let fall my  
plummet into waters too  
deepe, that if you lend not  
your favourable conſtructi-  
on in the perusal, I muſt  
ſuffer. I confeſſe my con-  
dence in your Gentlenesse is  
great;

great ; I shall therefore, without any further plea, after this long Parenthesis, give you a short account of what these papers beare.

You have here my poore thoughts upon the twenty-fourth Chap. of *Matth.* that I was forced to, because I quote it, more than once, in sense differing from our Commentators : yea, I was necessitated to run through the whole Chapter. It will appeare in costly robes , adorned with lofty and glorious language, sweetned by many a pleafant and cleare Simile, quickned by divers acute and learned Criticisms : These, none of these are mine : My Cabinet enshrineth no such Treasure. I confesse, to save the la-

bout of contending with  
*Pareus*, and others, I deliv-  
ered to a Friend Of Yours,  
and Mine, onely the *substratum* of the Discourse, desir-  
ing him, from those prin-  
ciples to undertake my ad-  
versaries: In lieu of this,  
he returned me the *Chap-  
ter* \*, imbellished with so  
much wit and learning, that  
I durst not call it mine, and  
so thought to have suppres-  
sed it; and Had done so,  
but that from the Law of  
friendship, you may chal-  
lenge a share in what is His;  
and from that reason it li-  
veth now, and is presented  
to Your view, hoping (for  
his sake, not for mine) to  
 finde grace in your eyes.

You have also, my  
Thoughts, upon the twen-  
tieth

\*Matth.24

tieth of *Revelations*, because therein I have done Two things.

First, According to my Model, answered your three Queries.

Secondly, Discovered my opinion concerning the Millenniums. I finde That point entertained by many learned and pious men, under various and different noti-  
ons.

Various  
sorts of  
*Millennia-*  
*ries.*

The first  
two car-  
nall.

The first who were of that opinion, lived immedi-  
ately after S<sup>t</sup>. John, as *Papi-*  
*as*, *Irenaeus*, and so on; in af-  
ter ages, *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*,  
*Augustine*, cum multis alijs :  
these men did a little Alco-  
ranize ; for, with *Mahomet*,  
they cast all the glory of it,  
into the outward pomp the Church should then enjoy:

I 4 Which

which is but as the body of that other spirituall beauty, wherein the Church of God shall at that time be more than exceedingly resplendent. Yet these men have happily fixed upon the due Season, expecting them at the powring out of the *seventh Vial*, a thousand yeares before the end of the World.

The se-  
cond only  
Spirituall.

Of latter dayes, most famous and glorious Lights, as *Calvin, Beza, Iunius, Tremelius, Broughton, &c.* have wrapt up all the glory under a *spirituall notion*, robbing both it and other Scriptures, of that sweetnesse ; whereon even Our Soules, but especially Our children shall feed as upon Marrow and Fatnesse ; where-

wherewith we shall be refreshed as with Wine refined upon the lees. *Contraries* may sometimes (in some sense) be *Errors*; the others erred because they have not the *spirituall*; and these have mistaken, not observing the *temporall* glory of this thousand yeares.

These last men are succeeded by a generation of Worthies, who have come nearer to the Truth; yet (if I mistake not) have missed it; and some of these are *Alstedius*, (who justly meriteth the Anagram of *Sedulitas*) *Mede*, and some others; who indeed expect a time of glory, confuting the first men, because they made theirs too carnall

A third sort, in some things too literal.

carnall. Yet doe they faile themselves, by placing the time after the burning of the world with materiall fire, spoken of in *Peter*; and joyning with it their opinion, of the resurrection of the Martyrs, which I do not wholly condemne, though therein I am not yet so cleere.

Lastly, we have the Reverend man Mr. Brightman, against whom I will not now dispute, whose opinion, seeing I must oppose it, when I mention it, I will not now name. For hee ought always à me non sine honore nominari. Pliny saith *Venerabilis Catonis ebrietas*, and so say I of Brightman, The very Errors (if errors) of Brightman have

have their beauty : I must confess, if God hath been pleased to discover light to me, I have borrowed from him. If there be any thing of sweet, I have gathered it from the strong. And I do seriously protest I have not with *Scaliger* the Souldier; undertaken *Cardan*, that his ruines may be my rise.

No , no , I honour his very Urne, and do beleeve that one day I shall see the Jews very zealous in raising to him some stately *Mausoleum*, who hath been the first meanes of quickning the affections of Christians to pray for their returne .

Sir, I have overtired your Gentlenesse, and your Patience.

tience, therefore now give me leave to refresh your spirits ; Let me in a word say here, what I prove more amply elsewhere ; the days are at hand ; We shall see the Laying of the *first stone*, if not the rearing of the structure to some good height.

I know there is a Great Reader, who, though hee hath *Lynx* his eyes, yet using overmuch the Septuagenary Spectacles of antiquate Antiquity, loseth to himselfe, and, by his justly-merited authority, robbeth others of, this sweet truth, of the Church her approaching glory, which is in my apprehension, as *blood* to the *veines*, as *life* to the *blood*, as *spirit* to the *life*,

life, as all to the Spirit. But certainly, while he thinketh the *witnesses*, to be yet unburied, hee doth bury two witnesses, which are as able to bring Christ to his Espousals, as the two post-knights were to naile him to the Crosse.

I know there is another worthy, who hath for many yeares stayed Christs fainting Spouse with flagons of Generous and Good Wine, who adjourneth our happiness by expecting the sad downfull of the two *witnesses*. But (as I have, I hope, cleerely proved elsewhere) That is past. *Malle ergo gaudio*, Tune up your ten-stringed instrument : Let us heare that pleasant melody of a Christian

stian Hymen; O Hymenæ! Let Your sweet spirit sing, and We will dance: For certainly ere long, all teares shall be wiped away from our eyes, and perfect fruition of Love will cast out Feare.

*And now, I commit You, and Your Hopefull, Flourishing Studies, to the expectation, and advancement of these glories which make way for the coming of our Saviour.*

28 MR 59

*\* And to Him alone be the glory*

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**FINIS.**

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The Contents of the severall Chapters handled in this TREATISE of TRUTH.

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